Showing posts with label NSA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NSA. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 22, 2020

Snowden book

I read Edward Snowden's book, Permanent Record, over the Christmas break. It's an accessible, engaging account of how he got to where he is.

His early education was shaped by the anarchic, liberal, open, collegiate internet of the late 20th century, before it began to be reshaped by commerce and states as the mass surveillance machine it is today. His family were supportive or possibly indulgent of his obsession with the computers and networks of the 1990s.

In school, Snowden hacked the system to avoid homework. Quizzes were worth 25%, tests 35%, term papers 15%, homework 15% and class participation 10%. He figured he could skip both the homework and the term papers and still comfortably pass by acing everything else. Then one of his teachers confronted him, asking why he had not handed in any of previous six homework assignments. Innocently Snowden explained his reasoning to the laughter of his classmates. The teacher complimented the young Snowden on his cleverness and, within 24 hours, changed the system to make homework compulsory. He also took Snowden aside and encouraged him to put his fine brain to more constructive use than avoiding work and to be aware of how records follow us around and the impact on his permanent record.

Snowden's parents broke up. He learned to be independent, went to community college and got a job as tech support for a small business, working out of the business owner's home on the south west edge of Fort Meade. Yes that Fort Meade - home to the NSA. Snowden was at work when the 9/11 attacks happened and everything changed.

He bought hook, line and sinker into the Bush/Cheney 'war on terror':
"It was as if whatever individual politics I'd developed had crashed – the anti-institutional hacker ethos instilled in me online and the apolitical patriotism I'd inherited from my parents, both wiped from my system – and I'd been rebooted as a willing vehicle of vengeance. The sharpest part of the humiliation comes from acknowledging how easy this transformation was, and how readily I welcomed it."
And joined the army.

Coming from family generations of which had served in the Coast Guard, Snowden wanted to serve his country through the branch of the armed services considered by that family to be the "crazy uncles of the military". He aced the entrance exam, went into training for special forces, got injured on exercises and was eased out on administrative separation.

So back went Snowden to community college and decided he could best serve his country through his technical prowess. But to do that he'd need to join the CIA, NSA or other intelligence agency. And to do that he would need security clearance - top secret (TS) and top secret with a Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) qualifier. This involved filling out some forms and "sitting around with your feet up and trying not to commit too many crimes while the federal government renders its verdict." As a military veteran of sorts and the product of a multi generational service family, most of whom had the equivalent clearances, he was a good prospect and in due course succeeded. By this time Lindsay Mills had also become part of his life and so closes part 1 of the book.

Part 2 opens with 'The System.' Snowden describes a system as "a bunch of parts that function together as a whole". At the Open University we have a slightly longer definition of a system:
  1. A system is an assembly of components connected together in an organised way.
  2. The components are affected by being in the system and the behaviour of the system is changed if they leave it.
  3. This organised assembly of components does something.
  4. This assembly as a whole has been identified by someone who is interested in it.
Given the systems Snowden was thinking about - the professional civil service his family were steeped in and the computer systems he was obsessed by - his working definition satifices. When it came to computers he was most intrigued by their total functioning, not as individual components but as overarching systems. So the natural inclination was to get into systems administration or systems engineering which is what he did. Sysadmins and systems engineers naturally incline to a craft of understanding how computer systems work and fail and develop the diagnostic processes that go into keeping them running and getting them fixed and retrofitted and improved and renewed. It is not unnatural, then, when working within government (albeit for contractors) for techies to apply to same systems analyst skills to the system of government. Which is also what Snowden did.

We know about the five eyes mass surveillance systems and activities from Snowden's disclosures in 2013, from PRISM to TEMPORA, XKEYSCORE to QUANTUM, TURBULENCE and beyond. Yet, in some ways, the most chilling chapter in the book is "Homo contractus". It essentially outlines the private sector infiltration of the US intelligence services.
"I had hoped to serve my country, but instead I went to work for it. This is not a trivial distinction... government had treated a citizen's service like a compact: it would provide for you and your family, in return for your integrity and the prime years of your life.
But I came into the IC during a different age.
...the sincerity of public service had given way to the greed of the private sector, and the scared compact of the soldier, officer, and career civil servant was being replaced by the unholy bargain of Homo contractus, the primary species of US Government 2.0. This creature was not a sworn servant but a transient worker, whose patriotism was incentivized by a better paycheck and for whom the federal government was less the ultimate authority than the ultimate client.
...for third-millennium hyperpower America to rely on privatized forces for the national defense struck me as strange and vaguely sinister."
Snowden goes on to explain the use of contractors is a con to let the agencies circumvent statutory federal caps on hiring. As contractors are not included in the limits, the agencies can hire as many as they have the budget to pay for. Post 9/11 was a time when no congresscritter was going to go on the record as opposing any resources the intelligence and security agencies declared necessary for the 'war on terror'.

Huge resources got poured into the intelligence agencies for technical surveillance infrastructure and the people to create, develop, deploy and operate it. A large proportion of the people working on this mass surveillance were, like Snowden, technically employed by contractors and sub contractors but working directly for and within the agencies, the CIA and NSA in Snowden's case. Many of those nominally employed by the private sector started out as government employees, as the private companies didn't want to pay someone to wait around for a year or more for their TS/SCI security clearance to come through. Once the clearance was secured they could swap a government job for a better paid private sector job, sometimes doing the same work. Snowden's first job was with the state of Maryland partnered with the NSA opening a new institution called CASL, the Center for Advanced Study of Language.

As the building in which CASL was to be resident was still under construction, he essentially did the work of a night shift security guard. Whilst there and considering his long term career as a federal employee, he was amazed to find few opportunities to work directly for the government. Most of the sysadmin and systems engineering jobs available in government were through "working for a subcontractor for a private company that contracted with another private company that served my country for profit." Given these positions provide "almost universal access to the employer's digital existence", it's surprising to find these circumstances prevailing in the context of security and intelligence.
"In the context of the US government, however, restructuring your intelligence agencies so that your most sensitive systems were being run by somebody who didn't really work for you was what passed for innovation.
The agencies were hiring tech companies to hire kids and then giving them the keys to the kingdom."
Snowden's first contracting gig was for a company called COMSO, subcontracted to hire him by BAE Systems. He worked at CIA headquarters in McLean, Virginia. He had been earning $30k at CASL and asked COMSO for $50k. His nominal "manager" at COMSO talked him up to $62k. Middlemen contractors charged the government the employee's salary plus 3-5%. The higher the salary, the higher the cut.

The actual job at the CIA was both depressing and enlightening. Depressing on the extent of the cynical restructuring of the agency by the Bush administration and the move to a dependency, particularly in relation to modern technical information systems, on external contractors. Enlightening on the extent of the access Snowden got to highly classified material and the insight that gave him into the reach of the CIA and the importance of intelligence operations. It also gave him a hankering to really serve his country by applying for a role in a CIA field office overseas, preferably in a conflict zone. That meant swapping his contractor badge for a government employee badge, swearing an oath to defend and uphold the US Constitution and going back to school.

The techie in the CIA field office or embassy is responsible for every piece of kit in the building, from computers to heaters, encryption devices to locks. For security reasons no embassy will employ local contractors on even routine maintenance. The tech guy and there are not usually that many of them does everything. That's what the 6 months schooling before deployment was for.

Conditions at the CIA Warrenton Training Center ("the Hill") were less than ideal and whilst there, Snowden got his first taste of what reporting problems up the chain of command led to i.e. no addressing of the problem and a marking of the card of the whistleblower. Instead of getting his preferred deployment to a war zone to actively live out his heart on a sleeve patriotism, he was sent to Geneva for his first overseas tour of duty.

In Geneva, Snowden got a front seat view of the changing intelligence world and the pivot of the CIA from human intelligence (HUMINT) to cyberintelligence (SIGNINT & COMSEC), not that the former was abandoned but became proportionately less prevalent.
" In Geneva... America was busy creating a network that would eventually take on a life and mission of its own and wreak havoc on the lives of its creators – mine very much included.
The CIA station in the American embassy in Geneva was one of the prime laboratories of this decades long experiment. This city... lay at the intersection of EU and international fibre-optic networks, and happened to fall just within the shadow of key communications satellites"
Following Geneva, he moved to Tokyo to work in his "dream job" for the NSA but again, technically, as a better paid contractor in the private sector, an employee of Perot Systems which was then taken over by Dell.

In Tokyo, communications interception was the primary mission. In Toykyo, Snowden's early work was to link the NSA and CIA systems. In Tokyo, he discovered the NSA were vastly technologically superior to the CIA and vastly more laissez faire about security. In Tokyo, he created a much more effective storage system for the NSA, called EPICSHELTER. In Tokyo, his mind boggled at the scale and reach of China's mass surveillance and censorship systems. In Tokyo, he first realised "the power of being the only one in the room with a sense not just of how one system functioned internally, but of how it functioned together with multiple systems—or didn't." In Tokyo, he began to become disturbed at US mass surveillance, even as he was creating, developing and operating elements of the systems involved. In Tokyo, he initially sated his concerns by assuring himself he was working for the good guys.

In Tokyo, he became aware senior intelligence and security community insiders had serious concerns over the Bush administration's unchecked expansion of warrantless mass surveillance. In Tokyo he accidentally got access to the classified version of the Report on the President's Surveillance Program, (PSP) filed in an 'Exceptionally Controlled Information' (ECI) compartment. Full classification TOP SECRET//STLW//HCS/COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN. Through the PSP report he learned of STELLARWIND, the NSA's general and indiscriminate, bulk collection of electronic communications. In Tokyo, he began to understand the political sophistry underpinning mass surveillance, such as the now ubiquitous claim that collected communications could only be considered to be legally "obtained" or "acquired" if a member of the agencies searched for or found them. Collected communications would not be legally acquired but would, nevertheless, be available for search and retrieval, in post hoc fishing expeditions, in perpetuity. In Tokyo, it dawned on him that the Obama administration had no intention seeking reparations for systemic illegalities or undoing any of the deployment of mass surveillance infrastructure undertaken by their predecessors.

By 2011, Snowden was back in the US, still employed by Dell, building cloud systems for the CIA. He was also getting stressed and depressed at the mass surveillance of the state; and not just willing but enthusiastic compliance and buy in of friends and the general public into commercial systems of mass surveillance. The stress led to illness, including epilepsy and he eventually took sick leave to recuperate. His next move, in 2012, was to Hawaii, still with Dell, a step down in terms of responsibilities, to facilitate his ongoing recuperation but now working for the NSA again. He was now the NSA's Microsoft Sharepoint administrator in Hawaii. Lowly in the organisational food chain but, as a manager of document management and "reader in chief", this provided the access privileges to gather comprehensive evidence on his nascent concerns from Tokyo, about US mass surveillance.

Having automated much of his formal work responsibilities he set about his task of surveying the extent of the NSA's surveillance capabilities, running into the standard security services secrecy, obfuscation, compartmentalisation, misdirection, bureaucratic code and all the other institutional processes available for keeping information from the light. He decided to automate this process too, with the approval of his boss, setting up a kind of RSS reader system on steroids. This not only scanned for or linked to documents but copied them. Snowden called it Heartbeat and gave intelligence services staff access to a personalised reader that collected classified intelligence documents (from NSA, CIA, FBI and Deparment of Defense) according to each individual's security clearance.

The volume of documents Heartbeat collected was enormous and although Snowden could see it all, beyond the capacity of a single human being to review. Nevertheless, it was through Heartbeat that he learned about Upstream (direct collection of bulk data live from private sector communications infrastructure) and PRISM (bulk data handed over by private sector actors like Google, Apple, Microsoft, Facebook and Amazon etc. and overseen, theoretically, by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, FISC). He learned of TURBULENCE, a collection of black servers hard wired into telecommunications companies' infrastructure, running internet traffic through filtering tools like TURMOIL to flag suspicious communications; and TURBINE which routs communications to the NSA, where other algorithms decide which malware to deposit (via QUANTUM) on the source computer, in order that the potential threat can be monitored.

Snowden began to become indignant at the intelligence community's blatant flouting of the US Bill of Rights, particularly the fourth amendment protections against search and seizure and also the White House, the courts' and congress's complicity in this. He was particularly incensed when the US Supreme Court decided to wash their hands of the issues in February 2013, when the Court decided, 5-4, that the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and their client, Amnesty International, did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the warrantless wiretapping program. (Substantively, the ACLU and Amnesty were challenging the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act 2008 (FISAA). FISAA is the law that makes the act of being a foreigner a sufficient reason to be a target of US law enforcement and intelligence services.)

He had, by then, decided to blow the whistle on the whole shebang. The ACLU case and embryonic mass surveillance enabling laws in the UK (the snoopers' charter which eventually got passed as the Investigatory Powers Act 2016) and Australia (multiple bills) only hardened that resolve.

Chapters 21 and 22 extol the virtues of whistleblowing and Snowden's perspective on the fourth estate but I'll leave the reader to peruse those for themselves.

Before he blew the whistle, however, he wanted one last job, not just administering or reading about mass surveillance tools but actually using them, particularly XKEYSCORE, the NSA's incredibly powerful intelligence search engine. A position opened up at the National Threat Operations Center (NTOC), one "of the few offices in Hawaii with truly unfettered access to XKEYSCORE", through Booz Allen Hamilton. Snowden secured it and so began his education in the coal face abuses of US intelligence systems. The shock was palpable.
"Seeing them made me realize how insulated my position at the systems level had been from the ground zero of immediate damage. I could only imagine the level of insulation of the agency's directorship or, for that matter, the US president."
Snowden had already smuggled the documents he intended to pass to journalists out of the NSA on SD and micro SD cards. The flight to Hong Kong and handing over of those documents to Laura Poitras, Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill, his escape, aided by Wikileaks's Sarah Harrison, to and entrapment in Russia when the US revoked his passport, has been well documented in the Guardian, the Washington Post and Poitras's documentary, CitizenFour.

The chapter on Moscow in the book is thin on detail and only outlines the discussions Snowden and Harrison had with an intelligence official on the day they arrived, noting also thereafter they spent 40 days and nights at the airport. During that time he applied, unsuccessfully, to 27 countries for political asylum. He concludes the chapter suggesting the Russians gave him asylum because they were fed up with the media scrum at the airport.

The penultimate chapter of the book details extracts from the diary of Snowden's partner, Lindsay Mills, in the aftermath of his disappearance to Hong Kong. She is a powerful presence and positive force in his life and it would have been nice to hear more from her. Mills and Snowden were married in Russia in 2017.

The final chapter is largely a whistlestop tour of the legacy of Snowden's revelations from his perspective - global awareness of mass surveillance, some positive legal developments like ACLU v Clapper in the US and the GDPR in the EU, some important developments in encryption like HTTPS, Secure Drop, Signal and generally more end to end encryption. But if we were concerned to avoid living in a surveillance society, it's too late, we're already there. State and commercial surveillance systems are more powerful and pervasive than ever and getting worse. They will require structural solutions - legal, technical, economic, environmental, individual & societal - pressures brought to bear to bring them under democratic control.

Monday, July 01, 2019

From Alan Turing to the mass surveillance machine that is the internet

I gave a talk, on Saturday last, at the 9th Tensions of Europe Conference in Luxembourg. Draft of my remarks below. They are relatively brief and as a result somewhat over-simplified.


From Alan Turing to the mass surveillance machine that is the internet

In November 1942, English code breaker, Alan Turing, arrived in the US on a four-month intelligence sharing visit. He was met by three immigration officers and very nearly denied entry and dispatched to Ellis Island immigration detention centre, due to anomalies in his documentation. Two of the three eventually agreed he should be admitted.

There followed an intense period of work with the US Navy’s intelligence service in Washington DC and Bell Labs in New York. This was partially hampered by bureaucratic issues with his security clearances, and Turing’s unofficial instructions from British intelligence to reveal as little as possible to their US counterparts. The British were distrustful of the US government and vice versa.[i]

It became clear that the absence of trust and cooperation was impairing the war effort and shortly after Turning’s visit, US Intelligence officials Colonel Alfred McCormack, Lieutenant Colonel Telford Taylor, and Lieutenant Colonel William Friedman travelled to Britain to work with the head of Bletchley Park, Edward Travis. Friedman played a key role in the cracking of the Japanese Purple code and Taylor went on to become the chief US prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials. The parlay between Travis and the US delegation led to the 1943 BRUSA Agreement (Britain–United States of America agreement) to share intelligence.

BRUSA in turn spawned the UKUSA Agreement in 1946 to share signals intelligence (sigint) and communications security (comsec, the security of the processes, infrastructure and products of that sigint).

By 1956 Canada, Australia and New Zealand became parties to the agreement and it became known as the Five Eyes (FVEY). This FVEY agreement (or now collection of agreements) forms the basis of intelligence cooperation between these countries to this day.



[Norway, Denmark, and West Germany became secondary associates in the 1950s.]

At this point I’m going to have to fast forward through decades and significant parts of the story.*
To the FYEV intelligence & security services in the 1990s. The Cold war was supposedly over. They were suffering what they considered to be underinvestment and lack of appreciation. The Internet & WWW were going global and there were serious concerns in the agencies about keeping up.

ECHELON, the satellite centred surveillance system, developed by FVEY in the late 60s to early 70s, intended to collect communications of Soviet leaders, military personnel and diplomats, had already been turned to spying on FVEY allies like Germany and France; and the surveillance of individuals and commerce, facilitating industrial espionage.

That’s not my conclusion btw, that comes from a 2001European Parliament report on ECHELON at a time when the FVEY alliance was refusing to confirm or deny ECHELON officially existed. The report said there was no longer any doubt – it exists but all the EU could do is ask the FYEY, nicely, to stop spying on us. Some members of the committee disavowed the report as too soft and declaring that the deployment of ECHELON constituted a blatant breach of European law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. It did conclude, however,

“However extensive the resources and capabilities for the interception of communications may be, the extremely high volume of traffic makes exhaustive, detailed monitoring of all communications impossible in practice.”

So even those who were deeply critical of the surveillance activities of FVEY accepted that these organisations were being snowed under with electronic data.

9/11 to 7/7

When the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US happened with the tragic loss of thousands of lives, everything changed. The US & UK now had a new demon to replace the Soviet Union – terrorism. So began the US orchestrated war on terror and huge resources were poured into recruitment and mass surveillance technology. Much of it was wasted e.g. Trailblazer and, if we take the word of NSA whistleblowers such as Thomas Drake or William Binney, fraudulently so.

Military action in Afghanistan began within weeks and followed in Iraq about 18 months later.[ii]

The action in Iraq & Afghanistan stretched GCHQ operationally.

On 11/3/2004 the Madrid train bombings, the biggest terrorist attack in Spain in history, killed 191 and injured more than 2000 people.

The following year. The 7/7/2005 London attacks led to 56 deaths and nearly 800 were injured.

The Data retention directive, an intimate part of the mass surveillance story in Europe

In the wake of the 2005 London attacks there was a reinforced urgency in government about doing something about terrorism. In the UK the Blair government obsessively pursued mass data retention and all manner of other privacy decimating policies, regulations and processes, culminating in the EU Data Retention Directive 2006. Government ministers were drilled to chant the poisonous & deceitful but powerful ‘nothing to hide, nothing to fear’ sound bite, at every conceivable opportunity.  One of the things, incidentally, UK governments are going to miss after Brexit is the policy laundering they pursued so successfully through the EU.

Mass communications data retention was later found unlawful in multiple high courts around Europe - Romania (2009), Germany (2010), Bulgaria (2010), the Czech Republic (2011) and Cyprus (2011) have all declared the data retention directive unconstitutional and/or a disproportionate unjustified interference with the fundamental right to privacy, free speech and confidentiality of communications.

In 2006 GCHQ began their ‘SIGMod Initiative’ (signals intelligence modernisation programme) on gathering, processing, analysing, assessing, storing, distributing and sharing communications data. The government proposed an Intercept Modernisation Programme (IMP) 2008 involving the spending of £12 Billion + passing a proposed new law, the Communications Data Bill. A small number of NGOs, notably the Open Rights Group, Liberty and Privacy International, managed to get the attention of the media and a few politicians, noting the proposals were a terrible idea and labelling the whole thing a‘Snoopers’ charter.’ And with the financial crash of 2007/’08 and an election imminent it was officially shelved but the government and security & intelligence services implemented it in secret anyway.
 
Snowden 2013

Meanwhile stateside, an insider at the NSA, Edward Snowden, decided that the activities of the FVEY had reached the point of unchecked intrusion into the lives of ordinary people to a degree that was unconscionable and indefensible. In June 2013 Snowden chose to smuggledocumentary evidence of these activities to Hong Kong where he handed them over to journalists Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras and Ewan MacAskill.[iii]

What was revealed was a spectacular array of FVEY resources, technical capabilities and activities, with a very limited degree of legal or political oversight, checks or balances. Mass surveillance was not only being conducted by the commercial behemoths of Silicon Valley and every economic actor with a Web presence but by governments of the FVEY alliance. And these security services, like Silicon Valley, had their processes and technologies[iv] targeted at entire populations.

One of the surprises for informed security and intelligence analysts that came out of the Snowden revelations was that GCHQ and the NSA had got these large-scale systems working. The history of government deployments of large-scale information age IT projects had not previously been promising.

Circumventing & breaking law

According to the Snowden documents, one of the effects of the FVEY agreement was that NSA shared intelligence with GCHQ to circumvent UK law and vice versa. The documents quote US intelligence services staff considering that their UK equivalents had no real legal restrictions to abide by. The UK end of the operation likewise talked of their light regulatory regime as being a ‘selling point’ in soliciting funds from the NSA, amounting to $100 million between 2010 and 2013. So, if there were technical legal restrictions on the NSA’s activities – e.g. not being permitted to target US citizens, they could just get the British to do the surveillance for them. Officially this was denied. 

Even where to request the information would be a technical legal breach, it could be circumvented by the transatlantic sharing of information, under FVEY, without the need for a formal request.

Snowden changed things in Europe, if not the UK. EU allies were angry at the scale and reach of FVEY surveillance resources, targeted at their populations, policymakers (including tapping Angela Merkel’s phone) and economic actors. The European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union became sensitised to mass surveillance and issued a series of decisions declaring the activities unlawful.

The European Court of Justice in the Digital Rights Ireland case in 2014 declared the data retention directive so bad it should never have existed and abolished it.

DRIPA 2014 – the UK’s let’s pretend the data retention directive didn’t get abolished Act.

The UK government decided to ignore the ruling. UK chief police officers issued an edict to their police forces to continue retaining data. When the government couldn't ignore it any more because they were being sued and the press were about to start paying attention to it, they passed a new law, the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014.

This contained 8 sections and was rushed through parliament in record time with no scrutiny, by means of a very rarely used parliamentary process, just as MPs were about to go on their summer holidays. [The party briefings instructing MPs what to say about this law in public were longer than the law and both the parties of the coalition government - the Tories and Lib Dems - and the Labour party were all in favour.]

UK Investigatory Powers Act 2016 [v]

Far from reigning in surveillance and other activities revealed by Snowden in 2013, and those previously known and found by high courts all round Europe to be in breach of fundamental human rights, the UK passed the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, to legalise them. Whereas the US made some effort to be seen to be engaging in at least cosmetic reforms to that nation’s surveillance laws, the UK government denied there was an issue, trotted out tropes about national security and “nothing to hide, nothing to fear”, issued gagging orders, ritually destroyed the Guardian’s computers and reinforced and expanded the scope of intelligence gathering activities permitted.  Providing this legal infrastructure, with extraterritorial reach, to enable and facilitate the exploitation of modern digital technologies and networks, nominally for security and intelligence purposes and, with arguably limited checks and balances, has profound implications for democracy, all around Europe.

It remains also, however, the long standing FYEY intelligence sharing operation between the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, that now deploys the considerable resources made available by the respective governments to exploit the infrastructure of the internet to engage in mass surveillance around the globe. This is not about FYEY being old and dated. The UN Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights both stem from the same period and stand strong; as do multiple other historic documents like the US Constitution and Bill of Rights. However, the FVEY sigint agreement, as an arrangement emerging from the devastation of WWII and the ‘Second Red Scare’ and designed primarily to facilitate the collection of intelligence on the Soviet Union, China and their allies, in the modern context now reaches deeply into the lives and homes of ordinary people.

Liberty and others have taken the battle over the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 bulk surveillance provisions back to the courts. In April 2018 the UK High Court ruled that the data retention elements of the Act were unlawful.[vi] On 11 June 2019 it emerged that, even with the extra permissions of the Act, MI5 had been acting so far outside the scope of the legislation, in relation to their data management practices, that documents compelled to be revealed to the court showed that the independent ‘Investigatory Powers Commissioner’ (IPC) declared the agency’s bulk surveillance data management practices “undoubtedly unlawful”.[vii] [The Investigatory Powers Commissioner was a new office, set up under the Investigatory Powers Act, charged with dual oversight, along with the relevant Secretary of State, of the activities subject to the Act.] 

MI5 had effectively been caught out unlawfully retaining innocent people’s data for years, failing to give the IPCO (IPC's Office) accurate information about repeated breaches of its duty to delete bulk surveillance data, and mishandling sensitive legally privileged material. Even if this can be chalked up to normal bureaucratic failings on the part of a government service, this must be concerning.

The reality of FVEY is significantly more complex than I have the time to cover here. It has not, in practice, facilitated blanket, open, totally frictionless sharing of intelligence between the US, UK and other FYEY partners. Just because they agreed to share intelligence and not spy on each other, did not mean they stuck to that agreement or collection of agreements. Intelligence and security services, even within national boundaries, tend to be complex Faustian ecologies of competing institutions, individuals, agendas, bureaucracy and politics, wrapped up in an evolutionary internecine game of the survival of the fittest, surfing on the cause of protecting national security.

We should take infinitely more care in building and continuing to expand the legal, technical & organisational infrastructure of mass surveillance. Such complex systems fail naturally - systems fail, people make mistakes, staff under pressure circumvent the systems to get the job done and the temptation to hide those failures is organisationally irresistible. It will always be so & that's before you start factoring in malign actors because complex systems can also be made to fail by internal and external attackers with nefarious intent. Create these systems and the failures will come. We know this because they have failed and there is not a computer scientist or security specialist anywhere in the world who can secure them and make them water-tightly safe in practice.


The internet has become a huge surveillance machine.

It is possible, as the Net is an entirely artificially designed and constructed entity, to wrestle/retrofit it into something useful that is not a mass surveillance machine. However, it will be difficult to do, in practice, as all the most powerful governmental and commercial economic actors, as well as us the masses of the bread & circuses distracted unwashed users, caught in the headlights of seductive surveillance, are addicted to that architecture of surveillance. 

The critical question is how. How do we cultivate, energise, harness, direct and sustain sufficiently powerful socio-economic, political, commercial, cultural, environmental, social and technical forces to transforming the internet into something with a human rights respecting architecture, at an individual, community, district, national, transnational and global level?


As Carl Sagan said, science and technology heap a new and awesome responsibility on the shoulders of scientists, technologists, policymakers and Jo Public, to pay more attention to the hazards and long-term consequences of advances, from individual, communities, regional, global & multi-generational perspectives, avoiding appeals to simplistic claptrap and the nationalism, chauvinism and hate mongering so prevalent in modern politics & media.


[i] The British worried about the rivalry between US navy and army potentially leading to leaks. The US were equally distrustful of the British and frustrated, given the 500+ US ships sunk by U-boats in the previous year, that they were so unwilling to share information.
[ii] {Katherine Gun GCHQ whistleblower case – UN second resolution, NSA memo 31 Jan 2003 requiring UK to spy on world leaders in the hope of blackmailing them into supporting war. This came about a week after GCHQ staff, deeply concerned about the legitimacy of the impending conflict, had been officially assured they would not be required to engage in illegal activity. Gun, a 28-year-old analyst, admitted passing the NSA memo to the Observer newspaper which printed it in full on its front page in early March, having spent a month confirming its provenance. AG equivocal legal advice on war led to Gun’s prosecution being dropped in February 2004}
 [iii] Unlike Wikileaks who tended to put everything openly on the internet, Snowden decided the documents should be curated by respected news organisations, like The Guardian and The Washington Post newspapers, with revelations to be made public selected purely based on the public interest and the avoidance of exposure of intelligence services personnel to risk.
[iv] [of what the UK end of the business now calls “bulk” interception, acquisition, equipment interference and personal dataset warrants]
My evidence to Joint Committee on Investigatory Powers Bill https://b2fxxx.blogspot.com/2016/01/evidence-to-joint-committee-on.html
‘S253 Technical capability notices
(1)     The Secretary of State may give a relevant operator a technical capability notice…’
Operators have multiple dutes to assist with implementation of IPAct measures.
[vi] [Since ministers were empowered by the Act to issue data retention orders without independent review and authorisation – and for reasons which have nothing to do with investigating serious crime – it was a breach of fundamental rights.] 
[vii] [He also said that he has effectively put them in special measures after discovering they were misleading the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office (IPCO).
“Without seeking to be emotive, I consider that MI5’s use of warranted data... is currently, in effect, in ‘special measures’ and the historical lack of compliance... is of such gravity that IPCO will need to be satisfied to a greater degree than usual that it is ‘fit for purpose'".]
*Including the cold war & evolution of sigint processes and technology, establishment of Menwith Hill and other sigint infrastructure, the Korean war, the development of the ARPANET, ECHELON, the emergence of the WWII sigint story, the Pentagon papers, Watergate, Nixon, the FISA court, the ABC trials, the accidental but happy coincidence of technology and regulation that enabled the early internet to be built on the back of telephone networks, with an end to end architecture – the ‘intelligence’ was not built into the network but rather the devices that connected to it – enabling anyone to innovate, Reagan’s Executive Order 12333, Duncan Campbell’s 1988 revelation of ECHELON (it was an extension of the UKUSA Agreement; He also detailed how Echelon worked), Tim Berners Lee’s creation of the WWW protocols, the WWW & Net going mainstream, the cryptowars, the internet’s midwifery of today’s big 5 tech giants, the West’s military adventures, RIPA, 9/11, the US Patriot Act, the ‘war on terror’, Total Information Awareness, Trailblazer, NSA whistleblowers Bill Binney (ThinThread) & Thomas Drake, National Security Letters, Blair government architects of the data retention directive 2006 and national identity cards and a blizzard of serious crime and anti-terrorism regulations expanding powers of law enforcement, intelligence & security services, US FISA Amendment Act 2008 Act – guilty of being a foreigner – Caspar Bowden & Microsoft, NSA violation of FISA court orders, Bush & Blair establishment and Obama and Con-Dem coalition consolidation and expansion of architecture and resources of mass surveillance conducted by FYEY. Some of Snowden's revelations
PRISM – targeted intelligence, this had some justification and defensible due process overseen by the FISA Court
Tempora – GCHQ hardwire tap of UK backbone cables (UK connected to 57 countries by fibre optic cables; US is connected to 63)
Upstream - BLARNEY, FAIRVIEW, OAKSTAR and STORMBREW NSA interception tools
Boundless Informant – metadata engine, data analysis and data visualisation tool
Blanket open-ended court orders for Verizon phone records
XKeyscore – the NSA’s Google, for collection of "almost anything done on the internet" (Snowden claimed he could wiretap anyone anywhere with it and indeed Angela Merkle’s and other world leaders’ phones were tapped; Angela Merkel's phone communications were monitored by the Special Collection Service, part of the STATEROOM program)
OpticNerve
Mainway - NSA mass phone tapping
Bullrun (NSA) & EdgeHill (GCHQ) to crack encryption
MUSCULAR (mainly GCHQ run) secretly tapped Yahoo! & Google data centres
NSA black budget to pay commercial organisations for secret access to their networks
Spied on gaming sites, charities, commercial enterprises like Brazil’s biggest oil company, dozens of world leaders including Merkle
TURBINE – malware
Tailored Access Operations (TAO) – NSA’s cyberwar sigint operation
QUANTUM suite of attacking facilities e.g. compromising routers, interception, duplication & compromising of traffic
Tapping phones of world leaders including Germany’s Angela Merkel
GCHQ’s Smurf Suite for hacking mobile phones
NSA & GCHQ tapping fibre optic cables to Google and Yahoo data hubs
NSA allowed to surveillance connections three hops from identified targets
UK operating a surveillance system where “anything goes”
If you want to know how some of this data collection and processing works one of the single most useful Snowden documents is the “HIMR Data Mining Research Problem Book”
And even that lot is a wholly incomplete OTTOMH list but then there has been a lot of activity in this arena since WWII.

Friday, November 18, 2016

Irish Senator on election of Donald Trump; and Trump's new gift, the Investigatory Powers Bill

Former Irish junior minister with health, justice and culture briefs, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin, reacted passionately to Donald Trump's election as US President, the seamless normalisation/acceptance of the international community of the new reality and the obsequious behaviour Irish government in particular.



No pulling of punches in this Senate tirade - ..

How are we, Mr Ó Ríordáin asks, supposed to deal with this monster who has just been elected President of America?

It would appear he doesn't believe in calling a spade an earth inverting horticultural implement.

A selection of other highlights...

"America has just selected a fascist and the best thing the good people of Ireland can do is to ring him up and ask him if it's ok to still bring the shamrock on St Patrick's Day. I'm embarrassed by the reaction of the Irish government to what's happened in America"

"Can the government not understand what's happening. We are at an ugly international crossroads. What's happening in Britain is appalling. What's happening across Europe is appalling. It has echoes form the 1930s and America, the most powerful country in the world, has just elected a fascist. And the best you can come out with from a government spokesperson is, well we have to talk about foreign direct investment. We have to be conscious of American investments in Ireland."

"There are 50 thousand Irish people illegal in America who I'm quite sure are fearful of their futures. When are we going to have the moral courage to speak in terms other than economy all the time and to realise what is happening?"

And that's the heart of it really. Power shifts to the scary. The elite, the corporate sector [nothing personal - it's just business], the privileged of every order shift our allegiance to the new masters because we'll be ok if we stay on the right side of those in charge won't we?

None of us pay heed to the warning of Martin Niemöller,
First they came for the Socialists, and I did not speak out—
Because I was not a Socialist.
Then they came for the Trade Unionists, and I did not speak out—
Because I was not a Trade Unionist.
Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out—
Because I was not a Jew.
Then they came for me—and there was no one left to speak for me.
Ó Ríordáin continues...

"I am... I am fr-frightened. I am absolutely frightened for what's happening to this world and what's happening to our inability to stand up for it...

I want to ask you leader to ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs into this House and to ask him how we are supposed to deal with this monster who has just been elected President of America; because I don't think any of us, in years to come, should look back on this period and not say that we did everything in our power to call it out for what it is."

Meanwhile UK parliament this week has quietly, without substantive opposition or media interest, passed the most pervasive and invasive mass surveillance legislation in history. The Investigatory Powers Bill is 304 pages of complex permissions for the UK intelligence and security services, police and other public bodies to engage in bulk
  • interception
  • acquisition 
  • retention
of communications data of the entire population and all other communications traversing the UK, access to bulk personal datasets held by other individuals, communities, groups, public services, civil society or economic actors and bulk equipment interference (aka hacking).

The depth and reach of the legislation is quite staggering. That it has been slipped through in the wake of Mr Trump's election really should not escape notice. 

GCHQ, the junior partners of the NSA, shortly itself to come under the control of a short tempered 70 year old toddler ascending to the White House, have now been provided with the legislative surveillance architecture of a police state. Given the close cooperation of the UK and US intelligence services under the Five Eyes arrangement post World War II, that will put this apparatus in the hands of a US President who promised, on the campaign trail, to re-ignite, expand and intensify US engagement in torture.

Slavery, racism, apartheid, the holocaust, rape (a British woman who reported being raped is facing jail in Dubai, right now, after being charged with the crime of engaging in extramarital sex) , homophobia, discrimination of all kinds were and still are legal in some places. Mass surveillance on an unimaginable scale is just about to become legal - pending the mere technicality of Royal Assent - in the UK. That which is legal is not necessarily acceptable in an enlightened and/or civilised society.

How can the UK, with any credibility for example, criticise Russia for blocking LinkedIn because the company refuses to host servers containing personal data of Russia citizens within that jurisdiction, when the Investigatory Powers Act reaches the statute books? They are just, they argue, attempting to protect the privacy of their own people.

Lifelong, genuinely committed intelligence and security services and other government officials, who have supported the expansion of Investigatory Powers Bill type laws on the other side of the Atlantic pond, for years, are nervous about serving in a Trump administration. Can any of the MPs, who were conspicuous by their continual absence from parliamentary debates about the Investigatory Powers Bill but, like well trained puppies, showed up when the division bell ping-ponged, to vote it through its multiple stages, in accordance with party instructions, seriously suggest they would be happy to have these powers in the hands of a dangerous or reckless US president? 

The chairman of the US Nazi party is pleasantly surprised at the president elect's pick for chief White House strategist. The Nazis. As for the opposition in the US congress, the probable minority leader for the Democrats in the US Senate will be Chuck Schumer, a man who reportedly supported the Iraq war, torture and the Patriot Act - the US's original legislative foray into mass surveillance.

Openly racist, homophobic, mysogynist, xenophobic, hate inciting bigots might not be as bad in government as they sounded on the election trail; but we should be very very very wary of smoothly handing them the controls of the infrastructure, the well oiled, indiscriminate, tools and unrestrained tentacles of a an all seeing, all hearing, ubiquitously observing police state. If the temptation to abuse these powers was irresistible when the good guys were in power, what's it going to be like if Trump uses them to follow through with even some of the hateful promises he made in the run up to the election?

Trump is inheriting extraordinary powers. Don't be surprised if he and/or the more extreme elements of his cortege decide to exercise them. As Daniel Miessler and many civil liberties advocates have said for generations, we need to be very careful about building all powerful mass surveillance tools because you never know who is going to get the keys. We gave up our rights under Bush, Blair and their successors because we were told to be scared of terrorism and the other horsemen of the infocalypse. We now bestow the powers decimating those rights to a Donald Trump administration, by proxy, through the US intelligence agencies close relationship with their counterparts in the UK.

Update: An edited version of this post has been published by New Scientist (Registration required for access). New Scientist YouTube video here.