Layla Moran MP has been getting a few communications from me in recent weeks.
Today, at the behest of the Open Rights Group: Asking her to support the protection of VPN use in the UK
Dear Layla Moran,
I'm a resident of Oxford West and Abingdon, and I’m writing to you as my member of parliament.
VPNs help people to stay private and safe online. Young people use them to avoid harassment, or protect location data. Companies use them to make sure remote log-in to their networks are secure. Many MPs offices, and public sector institutions use them to keep consituents personal data safe, and protect against the growing threats of international espionage. Journalists, campaigners and whistle blowers also use them to protect their work and themselves.
Amendments to the Children's Wellbeing and Schools Bill will give current and future ministers the powers to restrict any 'Internet services' without having to pass a new law. I amc oncerned that these powers will be used to restrict access to VPNs as part of wider proposals to prevent under 18s from accessing social media and other content.Forcing people to hand over their personal or biometric data when they buy a VPN, and restricing access to under 18s will mean fewer people are able to benefit from the cybersecurity protections they offer. It also gives oppresive regimes like Russia, China or Iran cover for their own attempts to restrict VPN and access to a the internet.
The intention of these proposals to keep children safe online is a noble
one. However age verification however does not dismantle the big tech
monopolies, or surveillance based attention economy that drives polarising and
addictive content linked to online harms. It adds another layer of data
extraction to the same system.
What has began as a policy aimed at restricting children’s access to
pornography is now expanding into a system of routine identity checks for
ordinary internet use.
Soon it will be almost impossible for adults in the UK to access the Internet
without providing sensitive personal or biometric data to a third party.
Age gating as a policy for general access to technology is deeply flawed:
• Age verification creates new harms for users in the form of data breaches and
leaks.
• Age verification doesn’t change the underlying system which creates online
harms, in fact it feeds into it with some companies using age data or
identifying information from devices to better target online adverts.
• It drives users to less regulated online spaces.
• It reinforces the market dominance of the big tech platforms by creating
barriers for small community websites, forum and the open-source community.
We need to stop the expansion of age verification and real demand reform that tackles the underlying structural power of big tech,
I urge you to protect the use of VPNS in the UK.
Yours sincerely,
Ray Corrigan
Wednesday 8th April: Request to attend the Westminster Hall debate on the NHS Federated Data Platform this week - April 16
Dear Layla,
I am writing as your constituent but also, particularly, due to your role as Chair of the Health and Social Care Committee, to ask you to attend the Westminster Hall debate next week on the NHS Federated Data Platform, on Thursday April 16, from 3pm to 4:30pm.
You will be aware that the Financial Times recently reported that government ministers have been seeking advice on triggering the break clause in Palantir's contract for the Federated Data Platform, amid mounting concerns about the company's role in NHS data systems. You will also know that the British Medical Association has called on doctors to limit their engagement with the platform. And a growing number of MPs from across the parties have raised serious questions about transparency, value for money and data security - as well as the suitability of a company like Palantir, with its controversial background in military, security and immigration enforcement, as a partner for the NHS.
The chairman of Palantir, Peter Thiel, is on record as declaring the NHS makes people sick and we should “rip the whole thing from the ground and start over”. The CEO, Alex Karp, has spoken, excitedly, of helping to kill people (https://www.youtube.com/shorts/vsdiUbJELiM). The history and ongoing activities of this company are not compatible with the core care ethos of the NHS or its foundation of doctor-patient confidentiality.
It is vital that as many MPs as possible attend this debate to demonstrate to ministers that parliament takes this issue seriously. The Palantir contract was awarded under the previous government, and the break clause falls in February 2027. There is a real window of opportunity to change course - but only if there is sufficient political will.
I would be grateful if you are able to attend.
Regards,
Ray Corrigan
Tuesday, 3rd March: Government massaging NHS waiting lists
Dear Layla,
As you know, from 1st April, GPs will be contractually obliged to seek remote, electronic “advice and guidance” from hospital ‘clinicians’ (not necessarily doctors), making it even harder for patients to see a hospital specialist.
The government seem to have no interest in fixing the NHS, as they repeatedly promise. This is yet another tactic to ration hospital care by overriding GPs in order to massage the waiting list figures. Extra bureaucracy that at best will delay patients’ access to the specialist treatment they need, while the government pump out more fake news about pretend falling waiting lists. Reducing the waiting lists by making it harder for people to get on waiting lists is unethical at best and potentially deadly and/or life altering for people who will get denied timely access to critical medical care.
This is yet another NHS scandal imposed by a government who care more about news headlines and spin than they do about rebuilding an NHS in deep crisis.
Regards,
Ray Corrigan
Monday, 1 December: Petition to block the introduction of Digital ID
Dear Layla,
I am writing, as your constituent, to urge you to attend the December 8th petition debate to represent my opposition to the government’s plans for a mandatory digital ID scheme. As you know, the Liberal Democrats have, historically, opposed national identity card schemes and abolished the previous Labour government national identity card when joining in a coalition government with the Conservative party in 2010.
Almost three million people have signed the petition, making it the fourth largest Parliamentary petition recorded. The scale of the response is not a surprise. Millions of people have well-grounded concerns that a mandatory digital ID scheme will pose a threat to privacy, upending our relationship to the state, and make British residents even more attractive targets for hacking by foreign adversaries and criminals. It is critical that the government hears these concerns at the upcoming debate.
The government initially pitched the digital ID scheme as a means to check work eligibility. But since the scheme’s announcement multiple ministers and members of Parliament have made it clear that the initial roll out of the digital ID will merely be the first step in a wider plan to, in the words of Minister for Intergovernmental Relations, Darren Jones, “shut down the legacy state”. Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Children and Families, Josh Macalister, has stated the “first use case for it is around right to work checks… we’re not saying we’re going to boil the ocean in one go because the public would be really sceptical of that, so we’re starting with this issue of right to work checks first but there are loads of other applications for digital ID.” The planned mission creep is not even being hidden any more – they are boasting about it.
There is no guarantee that this or indeed a future government would not make digital ID a requirement to access a range of public and private services – including healthcare, education, childcare, tax payments and accessing age-restricted services. A digital ID system will last far beyond this government, meaning that we risk building the mass surveillance infrastructure for a less rights-respecting future administration.
A sprawling digital ID system represents a serious threat to privacy. A mandatory digital ID scheme will gather and store information about us. Each time an individual uses their digital ID, that use may be recorded in government databases, allowing the vast amounts of information to be amassed, searched, and sorted to offer insights through data analysis and profiling. The public should not be forced to bare their lives to the state just to help it administer itself.
The introduction of a mandatory digital ID scheme would fundamentally change the relationship between the population and the state, shifting power away from individuals and towards the government. We currently operate in a system where we can prove our identity as and when we need to with a variety of methods. Mandatory digital ID would turn that dynamic on its head by creating a society on licence, where we might soon need permission every time we interact with the state.
Mandatory digital ID would put the population’s personal data at unprecedented risk of data breaches by creating a honey pot for hackers and foreign adversaries. In the past year, breaches of the legal aid database and Afghans relocating to the UK have resulted in the personal information of hundreds of thousands of people being leaked. The government’s OneLogin system is also reported to be susceptible to impersonation.
A mandatory digital ID scheme will not solve the problems its proponents claim it will and all the usual excuses for it have been rolled out – right to work checks, stop the boats, smash the gangs, halt benefit fraud, border control and multiple variations on tackling the four horsemen of the infocalypse i.e. child abusers, terrorists, organised crime and narcotics cartels. The government, this time, proposed the scheme as a means to crack down on illegal hiring practices, “tackle illegal migration, make accessing government services easier, and enable wider efficiencies.” If we have learned anything from the first quarter of the 21st century, it is that building and deploying infrastructures of mass surveillance does not solve these problems.
The government has not presented a convincing argument that a mandatory digital ID scheme, which will inevitably cost billions of pounds, will persuade criminals who already break employment and immigration law to change their behaviour. In the end, it will be law-abiding people who suffer the effects of digital ID through privacy intrusions and security risks.
One final point that might be worth making is that the digital ID scheme is being heavily pushed by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. This “institute” has received large sums of money from economic actors who stand to benefit significantly from contracts to build and operate the scheme. It reminds us to think of the five questions of a different Tony, Tony Benn –
- What power have you got?
- Where did you get it from?
- In whose interests do you exercise it?
- To whom are you accountable?
- How do we get rid of you?
Of particular importance in this context are questions 3 & 4.
The infrastructure of mass surveillance that constitutes the modern internet has been repeatedly exploited, by state, criminal and economic actors, to perpetrate widespread abuse, from basic privacy invasion to, tragically, the targeting of innocents for bombing. Another state-run digital ID surveillance system will only expand that capacity for abuse. If you build it, they will come – powerful abusers of all stripes, some even believing themselves to be well-intentioned, convinced of their own righteousness – and once deployed mass surveillance infrastructure is incredibly difficult to combat, control or decommission. Please stand in defence of civil liberties, attend the December 8th debate, and let the government know about the dangers associated with a mandatory digital ID scheme.
Kind regards,
Ray
