The UK's proposed under 16s social media ban is ill-considered

 When the history of the first quarter of the 21^st century comes to be written, it will record a period when we took the greatest communications medium in the history of humanity – the internet – and turned it into an invasive, toxic, mass surveillance machine, beyond even George Orwell’s imagination.

For generations, the four horsemen of the infocalypse – terrorists, drug dealers, child abusers and organised crime – have been the staple justifications of choice for a smorgasbord of laws intended to tackle these evils. The Labour government between 1997 and 2010 introduced more than forty major serious crime and counter-terrorism laws.

During the same period, unfettered, private sector mass surveillance & profiling, of a scale unthinkable before the turn of the century, plus addictive, attention- grabbing apps and social media algorithms, became established as the core business model of the internet.

The most profitable firms in the world either monetise or otherwise exploit data through stalker advertising and profiling and/or provide software and hardware services and infrastructure to the economic & state actors who do.

The technology systems built and rolled out by those companies are used, extensively, by states which, like commerce, have a voracious appetite for personal data, in the whole gamut of government services from law enforcement, health and social welfare to border control, military, security and intelligence.

In the wake of the 11th September, 2001 attacks, counter terrorism became the primary excuse for western governments’ expansion of mass surveillance. By the mid-2010s, it remained a core theme for government but the terrorism mantra was wearing thin and the prominent pretext for surveillance moved to immigration and border control.

In parallel, child protection and “online safety” became high profile vehicles for a collection of demands that something must be done about the negativities of the internet and the unethical behaviour of the big technology corporations. By 2023 that led to the introduction by the UK of the Online Safety Act, a complex piece of legislation with the “general purpose of making the use of internet services… safer for individuals in the United Kingdom” through imposing a duty of care on online services providers.

One of the primary effects of the Act seems to have been a boon in the market for age verification services. And, indeed, VPN services, which the government are also now considering restricting. Section 12(4) of the Act mandates the use of age verification or age estimation to prevent children from accessing harmful content. Section 12(6) says this age verification should be “highly effective”. In short, dear reader, age verification is not marginally, let alone highly effective and declaring a mandate for highly effective technology in a statute does not, magically, bring it into existence.

Ahead of the Makerfield byelection and his likely replacement by Andy Burnham, the UK Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, with his teen social media ban proposal, announced plans to polish a capstone on his legacy, such as it is, by forcing everyone to wade through some form of identity and/or age verification service before using the internet. The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model - seven layer model of the internet – is about to get an eighth layer in the UK, the insecure layer, if the October 2025 Discord data breach compromising 70,000 users, including their government issued ID images, is anything to go by. Mr Starmer’s insecure layer, retrofitted to a toxic mass surveillance machine, will compromise the privacy and security of every internet user, including children, whilst failing to improve child safety.

Last week the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee of Parliament, following an inquiry on the digital centre of government, published a report Rewiring the state: Delivering digital government.

The report is scathing on government information & data security (highlighting Biobank breaches), unsubstantiated hype about a claimed £45 billion per year savings from digital services, government plans for digital ID (noting operational and security problems relating to the eVisa system and One Login’s temporary loss of certification against the government’s own digital identity framework). On digital sovereignty the report expresses concerns that "The UK’s reliance on a small number of US-based providers for digital infrastructure and public service delivery is a strategic and economic vulnerability."

Most notably, in the context of the proposed teen social media ban, however, it declares government ignorance of technology, “enthusiasm from non-experts at the top” combined with “insufficient skills at the coalface” to be a “dangerous” combination. Dangerous is the word for it, particularly for those teens who rely on internet access for social, educational and mental health support, often exclusively because they cannot find that support elsewhere. 

The petition to parliament not to go ahead with this ban has already, at the time of writing, passed 200,000 signatures. 

A prime minister serious about child protection would firstly insist on enforcing existing regulatory measures, such as the UK GDPR articles 8 and 9, against social media companies and secondly, pursue orders of magnitude greater investment in social and sports facilities and infrastructure, children’s services, parental support, social welfare, education, health, mental health services and, where necessary, policing; with properly coordinated, local interdisciplinary teams across all these services working in tandem, the whole being greater than the sum of the parts.

Also, as Cory Doctorow says, we need to protect kids from online surveillance, the precise opposite of what the UK government is proposing: “Your kids can't be targeted by algorithms without the surveillance data that's being used to target them. They can't be funneled into pro-anorexia content or extreme misogyny forums without that funnel being primed by commercial spying.”

The Brazilian government, unlike the UK, Australia and many others proposing similar bans, has taken a different approach to provide for the protection of children in digital environments, Decree No. 12,880, of March 18, 2026. According to Victor Oliveira Fernandes, Brazil's National Secretary for Digital Rights, the decree tackles the problem at source by banning dark patterns and addictive design targetted at children, including infinite scroll, autoplay, time-based rewards, excessive notifications, obstruction of privacy controls and exploitative cognitive vulnerabilities. Maximum penalities can be 10% of a company's revenue in Brazil. It will be interesting to see how that plays out in practice. As Prof Fernandes admits, passing the law is only the start, it's efficacy will depend on how and how well it is enforced, what economic actors it covers and to what degree it causes a change in their unethical business practices.

Notably, the early evidence on the effects of an under 16s social media ban in Australia shows that it has led to little substantive reduction in reported social media use by adolescents under 16. It doesn't work.

Peddling a headline grabbing social media ban is just another ineffective but also corrosive and dangerous attempt at a quick fix to a challenging and complex sociotechnological problem. If, however, after two and a half decades of digital technology enabled mass surveillance and failed government technical quick fixes in relation to all four infocalyptic horsemen, you still believe the PM’s claim that a social media ban decimating everyone’s privacy is the solution to the complex issue of children’s safety, I wonder if I could interest you in the purchase of a couple of bridges, one in London, one in Brooklyn?

NO2ID response to the digital ID consultation

The NO2ID response to the government digital ID consultation should be compulsory reading for all MPs. And government ministers should be locked in a room, made to study it in depth, absorb and pass a comprehension test on it, before they are allowed to pontificate on the subject of ID cards or digital identity ever again.

Right up front it:

"recommends that the Government drops its current ambitions – certainly its intention to
create a new universal unique identifier and mandatory / coerced digital ID system with lifelong tracking – and instead focuses on making the primary credentials government already holds more secure, re-usable and useful for citizens, rather than itself."

Something they suggested to James Crosby back in 2008 which he summarised as:

"The expression “ID management” suggests data sharing and database consolidation, concepts which principally serve the interests of the owner of the database, for example the Government or the banks. Whereas we think of “ID assurance” as a consumer-led concept, a process that meets an important consumer need without necessarily providing any spin-off benefits to the owner of any database. This distinction is fundamental. An ID system built primarily to deliver high levels of assurance for consumers and to command their trust has little in common with one inspired mainly by the ambitions of its owner. " 

The response also reminds us that the government asks the wrong questions, assumes the answers are useful and that core issues missing from the consultation would take too many pages to list.

The introduction of a national ID is a fundamental shift in the relationship between citizen and state. That is long understood but the current Labour government are obfuscating and the Blair government, in particular, went to extreme lengths to propagandise this shift out of existence, extolling the wonders of a fantasy of efficient, joined up government, delivering frictionless, easy access government services. The mask slips regularly, as when the current Home Secrertary, ironically in an interview with Blair, declared she dreams “that the eyes of the state can be on you at all times”. Sylvanus Vivian's concept of parasitic vitality is alive and well and sometimes they are not even hiding the desire for that parasitic vitality is about government not citizens' and residents' needs.

The ID scheme proposed is, as NO2ID state, 

"coercive, insecure, exclusionary, privacy and rights-destroying, and the foundation of a “papers please”, lifelong surveillance society... the scheme’s structural features – a universal unique identifier, mandatory digital employment checks, facial biometrics, state-wide access and usage, revocation powers, cradle-to-grave ‘eligibility’ – are precisely the architecture that NO2ID was founded to oppose, which the British public has rejected (repeatedly) since WII." 

"In a free society, it is not for a person to have to “prove who they are” [my emphasis] – though it is often necessary in modern life to prove certain facts about oneself. That the entire digital ID system is predicated upon the former shows it is a backwards system of ‘official truth’ and centralised ID control, rather than a forward-looking system of Identity Assurance based on non-surveillant, portable, reusable,granular, verified and verifiable credentials." 

Like the Blair government (and the Bliar Institute is feeding the government most of their lines on the scheme) the current government are hoping their ID scheme will be a universal panacea for "more modern, efficient and personalised public services". They are so desparate to sell the scheme they repeatedly ask, in their consultation, for suggestions on what it can be used for. As NO2ID say repeatedly, 

"We do not want the government to use this system for anything, because it is fundamentally misconceived...

Government should instead radically reform the civil service and ensure it dedicates the resources intended to be spent (wasted) on digital ID to fixing the many flaws, errors, deliberate systemic
choices and bad policy decisions that have caused and contributed to devastating “personalised” disasters such as the Windrush scandal, the infamous Horizon case, and the ‘Monster Factory’ of the systems of Universal Credit, as well as more recent scandals around Carer’s Allowance and Child Benefit.

If the Government genuinely wishes to improve the public services, it should do the hard and
necessary work – not keep trying to present “digital ID” as a panacea for a whole host of issues
that it isn’t." 

The scheme is so full of basic security holes it is difficult to know where to start. One Login, "the umbrella [ID} service", the system company directors have to register through, lost its certification against the government's own digital identity trust network over a year ago. Yet it is still mandatory. The government cannot meet its own standards on digital ID on a scheme that only applies to a fraction of the population.

There will be no analogue alternatives and it seems it will only be available as a mobile app, not even usable with a PC or laptop. 

The ethcial and legal issues with the scheme are legion.

"Deleting their digital ID is everyone’s legal right under UK GDPR’s right to erasure, but if digital ID or any part of the architecture (e.g. One Login) becomes the primary way people access services and entitlements, or are the only way to perform specific legal duties – as in the case of company directors making certain filings to Companies House – then deletion will have far more signifiant consequences.

Any system described as “voluntary”... must ensure that leaving the system is both meaningful...and does not lead to negative discrimination...or...official coercion.

There are serious issues around transparency: will people know what persists on the system and how it will be used if they delete their ID? 

...There are also serious risks around coercion in terms of vulnerable individuals and domestic
abuse: an abuser could force someone to delete their digital ID, thereby cutting them off from
essential benefits or services. That the consultation document makes at best only passing
reference to this, and does not describe any of the necessary protections and mitigations should such a system be imposed, is deeply concerning."

It is pretty clear that the scheme, in its current half-baked form, will not respect the Identity Assurance Principle of Multiplicity, one of nine principles specified by the Privacy and Consumer Advisory Group (PCAG) in 2013. It looks likely, in fact, to fail spectacularly on all nine:

1 User Control
2 Transparency
3 Multiplicity
4 Data Minimisation
5 Data Quality 
6 Service User Access and Portability
7 Certification
8 Dispute Resolution
9 Exceptional Circumstances

I'm unsure whether to be relieved or concerned that the consultation asks the question "Are there any ethical factors government should consider that relate to revoking (i.e. cancelling) an individual’s digital ID?" As NO2ID say,

"Revocation is all about state power. 

While presented largely as an ‘anti-fraud’ measure, revocation raises extremely serious issues around due process, human rights and proportionality...

revocation would effectively ‘lock a person out’ of (aspects of) their daily life – potentially creating a new form of ‘virtual prison’, more chilling even than the highly surveillant, panopticon-like aspects of the proposed scheme...

the proposed ID system could over time be deployed as a form of enforcement – and even to exert political pressure... the government clearly considers itself to be benign – an assumption many do not share, and which world events are starkly illustrating cannot always be depended upon.

Even assuming no malign actor (elected or otherwise) ever gains control of the system, the UK’s government has provided many examples of administrative error, incorrect and/or out-of-date data, poorly designed algorithms and wrong data matching stripping large numbers of peope of their rights and entitlements. The Windrush scandal is probably the most high-profile instance of this... and yet government continues to conflate fraud with its own errors, and senior officials continue to blame victims without facing meaningful consequences.

Revocation must only ever be part of a judicial process; never automated, and with human review at every step; it must have a rapid accessible independent appeals process; there must be full transparency to the individual and a non-digital ‘safety net’ while revocation and disputes are being resolved; any Bill must expressly forbid ‘class revocations’ and on its face22 tightly define and limit the circumstances in which a person’s digital ID can be revoked; and – if individuals are subject to fines and/or criminal sanctions for fraud or abuse – so must officials and anyone involved in any revocation event,23 arguably to a greater degree given the power imbalances."

The consultation specifies the "The national digital ID will include a person’s full name, date of birth, nationality, and a biometric facial image (photo)." NO2ID name the elephant in the room:

"We note the consultation does not ask about the inclusion of these details. Rather it presents them as a fixed decision, while omitting to mention that the digital ID will of necessity contain a unique number – which the government somewhat disingenuously suggests it is “considering developing”. 

To say “If we develop a universal unique identifier” (UUID) – which is in practice the only way centralised ID systems such as this are used to ‘join up’ public services – in a consultation that is all about “making public services work” is at best evasive, if not outright deceptive. Does the Government intend to do what it says or not? And why does it never mention the ID number in the list of information included? 

The universal unique identifier (mentioned just three times in the consultation) is the classic ‘single number for every citizen’ that NO2ID has long warned about. While the document downplays it – saying, e.g. “this identifier would not need to be visible or used outside the public sector” – the UUID is the foundational architecture of a cradle-to-grave tracking system."

The scheme has lots of vague ambitions about mission and scope creep which NO2ID call out explicitly. There were around 50 categories of information included in the Bliar government 2006 National Identity Register. 

The joined up government philosophy raises significant concerns around privacy and fundamental rights. NO2ID are explicit:

"this approach to ‘joining up’ the state is highly surveillant and potentially dangerous. 

Cross-matching across services and Departments like this will tend to create a comprehensive
profile on each citizen...

Much like the notion of ‘official truth’ and the assumption that government databases are 100% correct all of the time, ‘joined up’ government is a fantasy; in reality, and all too often, it is a single point of failure. For this reason, the only ethical approach is for any and all cross-matching to only ever be done with the explicit informed consent of the individual – with full transparency, and always with the option of keeping identities separate. 

Given the context, however, consent in such situations can be highly problematic... 

Cross-matching also engages privacy and confidentiality concerns...

 worse than this are the ‘chilling effects’...someone...may avoid seeking vital help or
support, fearing ‘knock on’ consequences in other areas...

Tearing down silos in the name of efficiency ignores that silos often exist for good reason; when consequences and power imbalances are real, segregation and separation can provide essential protections...

where are the mitigations to protect due process and democracy?

...David Blunkett notoriously said “No one should fear correct identification”. A quarter
century may have passed, but history tells us otherwise. 

Centralised, quasi-monopolistic state-controlled ID is dangerous and other options exist...

 It is well understood that digital-first and digital-only systems are inherently exclusionary...

 Given the system is designed to provide government with a detailed audit trail of every individual’s life, not to provide individuals themselves with a detailed record of each event is unconscionable... 

the basic design assumption is that fraud or misuse will be almost entirely from the user end – with little to no appreciation of the power the government would be handing to ID checkers, and how to constrain and mitigate the risk of misuse and abuse from that end." 

NO2ID:

"recommend Government listens to people other than the Home Office and the Blair
government-in-exile, understands that the architecture of a “rewired state” fit for the future cannot be grounded in 1930s thinking, and comes up with an Identity Assurance alternative – rather than yet another Identity Management (Control) system – that sits within the original PCAG Principles ...

Digital ID is not a benign administrative initiative. It is a fundamental shift in the relationship between citizen and state, embedded within an architecture of compulsion and coercion, in contexts that will impact on tens of millions of people’s lives in ways far more profound than  fixing the public services’ – which, as the details of a never-ending stream of examples show, digital ID will not do." 

 

  NO2ID Illustration of UK Government Digital ID Architecture of Compulsion & Coercion

The reponse is worth reading in full. 

Emails to MP on use of VPNs in the UK, Palantir, the NHS and Digital ID

 Layla Moran MP has been getting a few communications from me in recent weeks.

Today, at the behest of the Open Rights Group: Asking her to support the protection of VPN use in the UK

 Dear Layla Moran,

I'm a resident of Oxford West and Abingdon, and I’m writing to you as my member of parliament.

VPNs help people to stay private and safe online. Young people use them to avoid harassment, or protect location data. Companies use them to make sure remote log-in to their networks are secure. Many MPs offices, and public sector institutions use them to keep consituents personal data safe, and protect against the growing threats of international espionage. Journalists, campaigners and whistle blowers also use them to protect their work and themselves.

Amendments to the Children's Wellbeing and Schools Bill will give current and future ministers the powers to restrict any 'Internet services' without having to pass a new law. I amc oncerned that these powers will be used to restrict access to VPNs as part of wider proposals to prevent under 18s from accessing social media and other content.Forcing people to hand over their personal or biometric data when they buy a VPN, and restricing access to under 18s will mean fewer people are able to benefit from the cybersecurity protections they offer. It also gives oppresive regimes like Russia, China or Iran cover for their own attempts to restrict VPN and access to a the internet.

The intention of these proposals to keep children safe online is a noble one. However age verification however does not dismantle the big tech monopolies, or surveillance based attention economy that drives polarising and addictive content linked to online harms. It adds another layer of data extraction to the same system.
What has began as a policy aimed at restricting children’s access to pornography is now expanding into a system of routine identity checks for ordinary internet use.
Soon it will be almost impossible for adults in the UK to access the Internet without providing sensitive personal or biometric data to a third party.
Age gating as a policy for general access to technology is deeply flawed:
• Age verification creates new harms for users in the form of data breaches and leaks.
• Age verification doesn’t change the underlying system which creates online harms, in fact it feeds into it with some companies using age data or identifying information from devices to better target online adverts.
• It drives users to less regulated online spaces.
• It reinforces the market dominance of the big tech platforms by creating barriers for small community websites, forum and the open-source community.

We need to stop the expansion of age verification and real demand reform that tackles the underlying structural power of big tech,

I urge you to protect the use of VPNS in the UK.

Yours sincerely,
Ray Corrigan

 Wednesday 8th April: Request to attend the Westminster Hall debate on the NHS Federated Data Platform this week - April 16

Dear Layla,

 I am writing as your constituent but also, particularly, due to your role as Chair of the Health and Social Care Committee, to ask you to attend the Westminster Hall debate next week on the NHS Federated Data Platform, on Thursday April 16, from 3pm to 4:30pm.

 You will be aware that the Financial Times recently reported that government ministers have been seeking advice on triggering the break clause in Palantir's contract for the Federated Data Platform, amid mounting concerns about the company's role in NHS data systems. You will also know that the British Medical Association has called on doctors to limit their engagement with the platform. And a growing number of MPs from across the parties have raised serious questions about transparency, value for money and data security - as well as the suitability of a company like Palantir, with its controversial background in military, security and immigration enforcement, as a partner for the NHS.

 The chairman of Palantir, Peter Thiel, is on record as declaring the NHS makes people sick and we should “rip the whole thing from the ground and start over”. The CEO, Alex Karp, has spoken, excitedly, of helping to kill people (https://www.youtube.com/shorts/vsdiUbJELiM). The history and ongoing activities of this company are not compatible with the core care ethos of the NHS or its foundation of doctor-patient confidentiality.

 It is vital that as many MPs as possible attend this debate to demonstrate to ministers that parliament takes this issue seriously. The Palantir contract was awarded under the previous government, and the break clause falls in February 2027. There is a real window of opportunity to change course - but only if there is sufficient political will.

 I would be grateful if you are able to attend.

 Regards,

 Ray Corrigan

 Tuesday, 3rd March: Government massaging NHS waiting lists

Dear Layla,

 As you know, from 1st April, GPs will be contractually obliged to seek remote, electronic “advice and guidance” from hospital ‘clinicians’ (not necessarily doctors), making it even harder for patients to see a hospital specialist.

 The government seem to have no interest in fixing the NHS, as they repeatedly promise. This is yet another tactic to ration hospital care by overriding GPs in order to massage the waiting list figures. Extra bureaucracy that at best will delay patients’ access to the specialist treatment they need, while the government pump out more fake news about pretend falling waiting lists. Reducing the waiting lists by making it harder for people to get on waiting lists is unethical at best and potentially deadly and/or life altering for people who will get denied timely access to critical medical care.

 This is yet another NHS scandal imposed by a government who care more about news headlines and spin than they do about rebuilding an NHS in deep crisis.

 Regards,

 Ray Corrigan

 

 Monday, 1 December: Petition to block the introduction of Digital ID

Dear Layla,

  I am writing, as your constituent, to urge you to attend the December 8th petition debate to represent my opposition to the government’s plans for a mandatory digital ID scheme. As you know, the Liberal Democrats have, historically, opposed national identity card schemes and abolished the previous Labour government national identity card when joining in a coalition government with the Conservative party in 2010.

 Almost three million people have signed the petition, making it the fourth largest Parliamentary petition recorded. The scale of the response is not a surprise. Millions of people have well-grounded concerns that a mandatory digital ID scheme will pose a threat to privacy, upending our relationship to the state, and make British residents even more attractive targets for hacking by foreign adversaries and criminals. It is critical that the government hears these concerns at the upcoming debate.

 The government initially pitched the digital ID scheme as a means to check work eligibility. But since the scheme’s announcement multiple ministers and members of Parliament have made it clear that the initial roll out of the digital ID will merely be the first step in a wider plan to, in the words of Minister for Intergovernmental Relations, Darren Jones, “shut down the legacy state”.  Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Children and Families, Josh Macalister, has stated the “first use case for it is around right to work checks… we’re not saying we’re going to boil the ocean in one go because the public would be really sceptical of that, so we’re starting with this issue of right to work checks first but there are loads of other applications for digital ID.” The planned mission creep is not even being hidden any more – they are boasting about it.

 There is no guarantee that this or indeed a future government would not make digital ID a requirement to access a range of public and private services – including healthcare, education, childcare, tax payments and accessing age-restricted services. A digital ID system will last far beyond this government, meaning that we risk building the mass surveillance infrastructure for a less rights-respecting future administration.

 A sprawling digital ID system represents a serious threat to privacy. A mandatory digital ID scheme will gather and store information about us. Each time an individual uses their digital ID, that use may be recorded in government databases, allowing the vast amounts of information to be amassed, searched, and sorted to offer insights through data analysis and profiling. The public should not be forced to bare their lives to the state just to help it administer itself.

 The introduction of a mandatory digital ID scheme would fundamentally change the relationship between the population and the state, shifting power away from individuals and towards the government.  We currently operate in a system where we can prove our identity as and when we need to with a variety of methods. Mandatory digital ID would turn that dynamic on its head by creating a society on licence, where we might soon need permission every time we interact with the state.

 Mandatory digital ID would put the population’s personal data at unprecedented risk of data breaches by creating a honey pot for hackers and foreign adversaries. In the past year, breaches of the legal aid database and Afghans relocating to the UK have resulted in the personal information of hundreds of thousands of people being leaked. The government’s OneLogin system is also reported to be susceptible to impersonation.

 A mandatory digital ID scheme will not solve the problems its proponents claim it will and all the usual excuses for it have been rolled out – right to work checks, stop the boats, smash the gangs, halt benefit fraud, border control and multiple variations on tackling the four horsemen of the infocalypse i.e. child abusers, terrorists, organised crime and narcotics cartels. The government, this time, proposed the scheme as a means to crack down on illegal hiring practices, “tackle illegal migration, make accessing government services easier, and enable wider efficiencies.” If we have learned anything from the first quarter of the 21^st century, it is that building and deploying infrastructures of mass surveillance does not solve these problems.

 The government has not presented a convincing argument that a mandatory digital ID scheme, which will inevitably cost billions of pounds, will persuade criminals who already break employment and immigration law to change their behaviour. In the end, it will be law-abiding people who suffer the effects of digital ID through privacy intrusions and security risks.

 One final point that might be worth making is that the digital ID scheme is being heavily pushed by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. This “institute” has received large sums of money from economic actors who stand to benefit significantly from contracts to build and operate the scheme. It reminds us to think of the five questions of a different Tony, Tony Benn – 

1. What power have you got?
2. Where did you get it from?
3. In whose interests do you exercise it?
4. To whom are you accountable?
5. How do we get rid of you?

 Of particular importance in this context are questions 3 & 4.

 The infrastructure of mass surveillance that constitutes the modern internet has been repeatedly exploited, by state, criminal and economic actors, to perpetrate widespread abuse, from basic privacy invasion to, tragically, the targeting of innocents for bombing. Another state-run digital ID surveillance system will only expand that capacity for abuse. If you build it, they will come – powerful abusers of all stripes, some even believing themselves to be well-intentioned, convinced of their own righteousness – and once deployed mass surveillance infrastructure is incredibly difficult to combat, control or decommission. Please stand in defence of civil liberties, attend the December 8th debate, and let the government know about the dangers associated with a mandatory digital ID scheme.

 Kind regards,

 Ray