"a statutory surveillance regime shrouded in secrecy, part of a growing
constitutional model which has led some of us to wonder whether the
tripartite separation of powers – legislature, judiciary, executive –
conventionally derived from Locke, Montesquieu and Madison still holds
good. The security apparatus is today able in many democracies to exert a
measure of power over the other limbs of the state that approaches
autonomy: procuring legislation which prioritises its own interests over
individual rights, dominating executive decision-making, locking its
antagonists out of judicial processes and operating almost free of
public scrutiny. The arbitrary use of sweeping powers of detention,
search and interrogation created by the (pre-9/11) Terrorism Act, which
recently made headlines with the detention of David Miranda at Heathrow,
illustrates a long-term shift both in what is constitutionally
permissible and in what is constitutionally acceptable. The former may
be a matter for Parliament, but the latter is still a matter for the
rest of us."
He is also scathing about the Blair government's "making the Lord Chancellorship a secondary occupation of the new secretary of state for justice" and the current government's cynical exploitation of that change to dismantle our legal aid and judicial review processes.
"The decision in 2012 to put a political enforcer,
Chris Grayling, in charge of the legal system carried a calculated
message: the rule of law was from now on, like everything else, going to
be negotiable. The incoming legal aid reforms were introduced by a
consultation paper which gave a dismissively short time for responses
and parodied its own case for attenuating legal aid by pointing out that
people affected by unlawful state action ‘may represent themselves in
court, seek to resolve issues by themselves, pay for services which
support self-resolution, pay for private representation or decide not to
tackle the issue at all’.*
This is an argument not for modifying or reducing legal aid but for
abolishing it, something the Treasury has wished it could do for half a
century, but which the consultation paper, describing legal aid as a
‘hallmark of a fair, open justice system’, purports not to support.Instead, Grayling’s proposal is to undermine judicial review by starving claimants of legal aid on several fronts...
In recent years a practice has developed – routinely denied by ministers
but privately confirmed by their civil servants – of flying kites as
lightning conductors: a consultation paper or a bill will include an
outrageous proposal which government neither needs nor particularly
wants (an example in the legal aid consultation was the proposal, now
dropped, to deny criminal defendants any choice in the lawyer to
represent them). When it has served its purpose of distracting attention
from other objectionable provisions, it can be abandoned. The trouble
is that there are so many other objectionable proposals in the current
legal aid consultation, it’s not easy to know which, if any, of them are
kites. What we do know is what the 145 barristers who, as members of
the attorney-general’s panels, argue cases on behalf of the central
state, wrote to him in their joint letter: ‘We consider that the
proposals in the consultation paper will undermine the accountability of
public bodies to the detriment of society as a whole and the vulnerable
in particular.’"
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