Interpol chief questions body scanner rollout

From the Register:

"The head of Interpol has questioned whether the ongoing scramble by western governments to install body scanners at airports is financially worthwhile and said they are is unlikely to stop terrorists."

Good for him!

Geist: ACTA part 5

Part 5 of Michael Geist's guide to ACTA is now available.

Liberal Democrats support strip search machines?

Liberal Democrat MEP, Sarah Ludford has been pontificating about digital strip search machines in the Guardian.

"So the Westminster parliament and European Union lawmakers (including MEPs) must not only guarantee to the travelling public that their images will be deleted. They must also ensure that body scanners will not be physically capable of storage and transmission. This seems the only way to guarantee that the state will not try to further invade our privacy in future, and that images of celebrities, children or others will not find their way onto the internet and TV. Our fundamental human right to a private life demands no less."

No Ms Ludford.  The only way to ensure these machines are not used to invade our privacy is to ban them. 

This woman is the Liberal Democrat European justice & human rights spokeswoman.  To echo Elizabeth Wilmhurst at yesterday's Chilcot hearing it is extraordinary that the political chattering classes can view the world through such distorted lenses as to assume the deployment of strip search machines for the masses is a reasonable response to a failed bomb plot. Remember that these machines do strip search but don't detect incendiary materials.

I wonder what Churchill, Roosevelt, Truman and others who fought two world wars in the name of freedom would have made of the inheritors of their legacy?  Ben Franklin might be tempted to draw on one of his own quotes:

"They who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety."

The cost of 3 strikes regimes

More from Michael Geist, this time on ACTA and the cost of 3 strikes regimes.

"Canadian officials travel to Guadalajara, Mexico this week to resume negotiations on the still-secret Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement. The discussion is likely to turn to the prospect of supporting three strikes and you’re out systems that could result in thousands of people losing access to the Internet based on three allegations of copyright infringement. Leaked ACTA documents indicate that encouraging the adoption of three-strikes - often euphemistically described as “graduated response” for the way Internet providers gradually send increasingly threatening warnings to subscribers - has been proposed for possible inclusion in the treaty.

While supporters claim that three strikes is garnering increasing international acceptance, the truth is implementation in many countries is a mixed bag. Countries such as Germany and Spain have rejected it, acknowledging criticisms that loss of Internet access for up to a year for an entire household is a disproportionate punishment for unproven, non-commercial infringement."

Geist ACTA guide part 2

Speaking of ACTA, here's Michael Geist's ACTA guide part 2.

"Negotiations in the 7th round of the ACTA talks open this morning in Mexico with civil enforcement issues on the agenda.  Yesterday I postedon the developments to-date, including a chronology of talks, issues, and leaks that have led to this week's round of discussions...

Of far greater importance are the leaked documents.  These have confirmed how the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement is designed to extend far beyond counterfeiting and how it would reshape domestic law in many countries, including Canada.  Links to all the leaks are posted below.  Note that many are dated and therefore reflect initial thinking but may have changed over the course of recent discussions.

• Confidentiality statement: terms of confidentiality for ACTA documents (U.S.)
• Business Group demands for ACTA
• 2007 Outline Proposal for ACTA
• EU Analysis of the ACTA Internet chapter
• EU Advance Summary of the ACTA Internet chapter
• Canadian non-paper on Institutional arrangements
• Definitions (U.S.)
• Border Measures Chapter (U.S. and Japan)
• Criminal Provisions Chapter (U.S. and Japan)
• Civil Enforcement Chapter (U.S. and Japan)"

James Boyle: Obama record on tech policy is mixed

James Boyle has another terrific article in the FT, this time on Obama's mixed record on tech policy

"Let us start 2010 with some good news. In June of last year, I wrote about the Obama Administration’s record on technology policy. There was much to praise in the reinvigoration of the FCC’s commitment to “net neutrality,” (the commitment to a non-discriminatory internet) and a lot to hope for in terms of patent policy.
Unfortunately, in the copyright realm, the Obama administration had devoted itself, like its predecessors, largely to a content industry agenda which has given us mind-numbingly long copyright terms, intrusive legally backed digital rights management, and even a new proposal to cut individuals off from the internet simply for being accused, three times, of illicit downloading."

He goes on to discuss the US's changed stance on the WIPO copyright exceptions treaty for the visually impaired - having originally opposed it the US now supports it - and the secret ACTA negotiations, which if "this were to be debated in public in London or Paris or Washington, those proposals would meet with furious objections by everyone from civil libertarians to the communications and consumer electronics industry."  Read the whole thing. You can't beat James for succinct, engaging, educational reporting on intellectual property and this stuff is incredibly important.

Digital Economy bill debate: quote of the week

Via the wonderful Lilian Edwards, the quote of the week in the House of Lords debate on the government's Digital Economy bill came from Lord Lucas:

"We have to be careful about setting out to criminalise, as he says, a large proportion of our population, particularly when it involves putting them not in the hands of the criminal law with all the safeguards, care and rationality that involves, but in the hands of firms of solicitors who are out to make a

12 Jan 2010 : Column 423

buck from the process. None of these people are nice to deal with."

Court drops Jammie Thomas P2P damages from $1.9 million to $54,000

From Ars Technica:

"Judge Michael Davis is the senior federal jurist in Minnesota. He presides over the gleaming 15th floor courtroom where, earlier this year, P2P user Jammie Thomas-Rasset was slapped with $1.92 million in damages for sharing 24 songs. Davis made no comment on the amount of the award and showed no emotion as it was read out.
But now we know how he rely feels about the jury's work in that case: it led to a "monstrous and shocking" damage award that veered into "the realm of gross injustice."
Davis used his power of remittitur today to slash the damage award by 97.2 percent, from $1.92 million down to $54,000—and he suggested that even this lower amount was too high."

Strip search machines don't work

This 10 minute German TV piece about digital strip search machines shows how the machine failed to spot materials which were subsequently quickly combined to make an incendiary device.
Pretty self explanatory even if you don't speak German

How did OiNK get away with it?

Andres has a succinct analysis of the issues in the OiNK torrent filesharing case.

"So, it is clear that OiNK was in the wrong, and the fate of Mr Alan Ellis was sealed, right? Not really.  The problem seems to have been that prosecutors chose to charge Mr Ellis with conspiracy to defraud, instead of anything related to copyright infringement.  This meant that they had to prove that Mr Ellis was trying to defraud its customers, when it was clear that he was offering a service, and his clientèle knew fully well what they were getting into.  No fraud then.
Why didn’t the prosecution try for copyright infringement offences?  For example, s107 CDPA establishes criminal offences for various copyright infringement acts made “in the course of business”.  As Mr Ellis was clearly profiting handsomely from his services, it could be argued strongly that he was infringing copyright for commercial gain.  Or can it?  The main problem with torrent sites is precisely that no infringing copies are kept on the servers, and that the trackers act simply as facilitators.  Using a real-world analogy, torrent sites are more akin to bar lounges where illicit goods change hands.  Nonetheless, s107 also covers secondary infringement offences, such as communicating infringing copies to the public, which one might think is precisely what a torrent site does.  However, the wording of UK copyright law is problematic in this respect, as it seems entirely drafted with physical copyright infringement in mind...

It seems then that prosecutors were not sure to obtain a guilty verdict through copyright infringement.  OUT-Law makes a good point that the best way to proceed was to pursue OiNK for authorising copyright infringement, which is a civil offence for secondary infringement (see s24(2) CDPA)."

 

Swedish ISP appeals court order to identity torrent owner

From TorrentFreak:

"The Swedish ISP TeliaSonera is refusing to comply with a court ruling ordering the company to hand over information identifying the owner of SweTorrents. Instead, it has appealed the decision, arguing that the verdict is in violation of the European data retention directive and claiming that SweTorrents doesn’t host any copyrighted files."

The piece goes on to claim that if the ISP's appeal is successful the new (2009) Swedish implementation of the Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement directive "will be crushed". Don't bet on it.

Ellis of Oink found not guilty

Interesting jury decision in the Oink case. Alan Ellis who ran the site has been found not guilty of fraud.

"As the case centered on an accusation of fraud, and prosecutors also had to prove Ellis made a profit and prosecutors moved to show the amount of money made by Ellis by operating the venture. It appeared from evidence given that there wasn't a subscription fee as such for using Oink, but users were encouraged to make donations, and it's alleged that a donation was compulsory whenever someone wanted to invite a friend to join the community.

Prosecutors said Ellis had amassed $300,000 in donations in his PayPal account by the time site was shut down and was receiving about $18,000 each month in ‘donations’ – and that he had £20,000 in his bank accounts. Ellis insisted that the monies were to pay server costs – and possibly buy a new server - and that he, unlike the Oink’s actual users, wasn’t personally guilty of infringement, because he didn't personally host or share any infringing content. By way of an aside, in the US in MGM v Grokster a charge of what was in effect 'authorising infringement' was successfully brought and in Sweden the four men behind The Pirate Bay were found guilty of copyright infringement...

Well, we can report the verdict - and in this case Mr Elllis has been found NOT GUILTY. He left court without speaking to reporters.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/tees/8461879.stm"

Ireland plans for DNA database advancing

Thanks to TJ McIntyre for alerting me via EDRI-gram to the latest Irish government plans to establish a DNA database.  Innocent people's DNA details are to be held for 3 years.

"The Irish Government has announced that it will publish legislation this week to set up a national DNA database. The Bill follows a 2005 Report of the Law Reform Commission on Establishment of a DNA Database but was delayed by the European Court of Human Rights action in S and Marper vs. the United Kingdom and has since been revised in light of that case.
The legislation proposes to allow Gardaí (Police) to forcibly take samples (such as hair, saliva, nail clippings or blood) from those suspected of committing a criminal offence carrying a possible sentence of five years imprisonment or more. Samples will be stored indefinitely where suspects are convicted; where persons are acquitted or released without charge they will still be retained for a three year period. 4.1 million euros has been allocated for the start-up costs associated with the database in 2010.
In 2007, the Irish Human Rights Commission was critical of a previous draft of the legislation. Until the full Bill is published it is unclear to what extent it will address these concerns.
In a separate development, it has emerged that a Dublin children's hospital has been holding DNA records of almost every person born in Ireland since 1984 without consent. The Temple Street Children's Hospital has acted as a national centre for "heel prick tests" which involve the taking of a blood sample from each newborn child and using that sample to screen for disease. However, the hospital does not destroy those samples when screening is complete but instead retains those samples indefinitely, linked to the individual. There are approximately 1.54 million samples held on this database, which would include the overwhelming majority of Irish people aged 25 or younger. The hospital is currently under investigation by the Data Protection Commissioner who may order the destruction of these samples.
Law Reform Commission, Report on the Establishment of a DNA Database (11.2005)
http://www.lawreform.ie/DNA%20Database%20Report%20No1.pdf
Irish Human Rights Commission, Safeguards in DNA Database Scheme of Bill 'Inadequate' (8.08.2007)
http://www.ihrc.ie/press_releases/newsarticle.asp?NID=215&NCID=12&T=N
Connolly, Suspects forced to give DNA samples under new legislation (20.12.2009)
http://www.sbpost.ie/news/suspects-forced-to-give-dna-samples-under-new-legislation-46388.html
Connolly, New DNA Bill faces opposition (20.12.2009)
http://www.sbpost.ie/news/ireland/new-dna-bill-faces-opposition-46369.html
Dáil debates (10.12.2009)
http://www.kildarestreet.com/debates/?id=2009-12-10.551.0
Tighe, Hospital keeps secret DNA file (27.12.2009)
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/ireland/article6968561.ece
Tighe, Records stolen from hospital that held secret DNA database (10.01.2010)
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/ireland/article6982446.ece
(Contribution by TJ McIntyre - EDRi-member Digital Rights Ireland)"

Commissioner Reding warning re. strip search machines

The Washington Post reports that Commissioner Reding is asking for some restraint on the out of control idea to deploy strip search machines at all airports.

"The European Union should not rush into introducing full-body scanners at airports but give consideration to privacy and health questions, the EU's justice commissioner-designate said on Tuesday...

"We need to look at less intrusive means; Human beings have dignity and every measure has to be clarified first. Does it respect human dignity, does it respect privacy and does it respect health?...

We have to have a very clear line on this. We must never be driven by fear but by our values," Reding told parliamentarians.  "

Finally some sense.

Google book settlement and the future of books

Professor Pamela Samuelson's forthcoming Minnesota Law Review article on the Google books settlement is now available via SSRN. Abstract:

"The Google Book Search (GBS) initiative once promised to test the bounds of fair use, as the company started scanning millions of in-copyright books from the collections of major research libraries. The initial goal of this scanning was to make indexes of the books’ contents and to provide short snippets of book contents in response to pertinent search queries. The Authors Guild and five trade publishers sued Google in the fall of 2005 charging that this scanning activity was copyright infringement. Google defended by claiming fair use. Rather than litigating this important issue, however, the parties devised a radical plan to restructure the market for digital books, which was announced on October 28, 2008, by means of a class action settlement of the lawsuits. Approval of this settlement would give Google—and Google alone—a license to commercialize all out-of-print books and to make up to 20 per cent of their contents available in response to search queries (unless rights holders expressly forbade this)."

This article discusses the glowingly optimistic predictions about the future of books in cyberspace promulgated by proponents of the GBS settlement and contrasts them with six categories of serious reservations that have emerged about the settlement. These more pessimistic views of GBS are reflected in the hundreds objections and numerous amicus curiae briefs filed with the court responsible for determining whether to approve the settlement. GBS poses risks for publishers, academic authors and libraries, professional writers, and readers as well as for competition and innovation in several markets and for the cultural ecology of knowledge. Serious concerns have also been expressed about the GBS settlement as an abuse of the class action process because it usurps legislative prerogatives. The article considers what might happen to the future of books in cyberspace if the GBS deal is not approved and recommends that regardless of whether the GBS settlement is approved, a consortium of research libraries ought to develop a digital database of books from their collections that would enhance access to books without posing the many risks to the public interest that the GBS deal has created"

Conclusion:

"Google has made two bold moves with GBS. The first was to undertake the scanning of millions of books in order to index their contents, make snippets available to potential readers, and make nondisplay uses to refine its search technologies. The second was to settle the lawsuit brought against it charging the firm with copyright infringement so that Google could commercialize most of the books it had scanned. At first blush, this seems like a win-win-win, that is, a win for Google which would now be able to develop revenue models from which to recoup its investment in GBS, a win for authors and publishers who would enjoy a substantial share of the revenue stream generated from GBS books, and a win for the public which would have increased free access to books, as well as opportunities to have even greater access through subscriptions and purchases.
The second bold move has, however, proven to be far more controversial than the first. Even those who follow developments in the publishing industry closely have expressed reservations about it:

[W]as it ever reasonable to think that such a revolutionary, unprecedented pact, negotiated in secret over three years by people with loose claims of representation, concerning a wide range of stakeholders, both foreign and domestic, involving murky issues of copyright and the rapidly unfolding digital future, could be pushed through as a class action settlement within a period of months, in the teeth of a historic media industry transition?291

This Article has shown that although there are some reasons to be optimistic about the future of books in cyberspace if the GBS settlement is approved, there are even more reasons to be worried about the settlement and its consequences for competition and innovation down the line, as well as for sustained public access to knowledge, and to doubt that the bright promise proclaimed by GBS proponents is likely to be achieved.
The future of public access to the cultural heritage of humankind embodied in books is too important to leave in the hands of one company and one registry that will have a de facto monopoly over a huge corpus of digital books and rights in them.
Google has yet to accept that its creation of this substantial public good brings with it public trust responsibilities that go well beyond its corporate slogan about not being evil."

 Highly recommended. In fact if you want to get a comprehensive handle on the Google Book settlement, everything written by Prof. Samuelson on the subject is recommended. Here, here, here and here for example.

Judge rules movie industry not a cartel

There was another interesting development in the RealNetworks case against the movie industry last Friday when Judge Patel ruled that the industry was not a cartel.

"For years, RealNetworks has wanted to produce and sell a product called RealDVD that would enable the legal owners of DVD movies to copy their content onto a hard disk drive, in order that the original discs may stay protected like archival copies. Movie studios responded in September 2008 by suing Real, alleging that its technology intentionally circumvented their copy control system -- a circumvention that violated the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act. That led to an injunction barring any sale of RealDVD, which is still in force today.
Real then responded with a countersuit, blasting the movie studios with an allegation that they were leveraging the DMCA as a platform on which to build a kind of content cartel...

But Judge Marilyn Hall Patel ruled Friday that just because Real believed there was no need to purchase a license, did not prevent it from negotiating to purchase a license. Thus the movie studios could not have collectively prevented Real from making a copying mechanism possible, since the alternative of negotiation was there and has always been there."

The judge said:

"Any assertion by Real that the Studios' refusal to license the copying of DVDs caused an antitrust injury apart from the delay resulting from the injunctive relief is contradicted by Real's assertions that it believed no license was necessary."

ECHR: UK terror stop & search illegal

The European Court of Human Rights, in the case of Gillan and Quinton v. The United Kingdom (Application no. 4158/05) , has declared the blanket police stop and search powers, granted under the UK Terrorism Act 2000, to be in breach of article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the right to respect for private and family life). Note as often with the ECHR database, the link may be transient but a search for 'Gillan' in the HUDOC search engine will bring up the decision.

"57.  The Court observes that although the length of time during which each applicant was stopped and search did not in either case exceed 30 minutes, during this period the applicants were entirely deprived of any freedom of movement. They were obliged to remain where they were and submit to the search and if they had refused they would have been liable to arrest, detention at a police station and criminal charges. This element of coercion is indicative of a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (see, for example, Foka v. Turkey, no. 28940/09, §§ 74-79, 24 June 2008). In the event, however, the Court is not required finally to determine this question in the light of its findings below in connection with Article 8 of the Convention...

65.  Each of the applicants was stopped by a police officer and obliged to submit to a search under section 44 of the 2000 Act... the Court considers that these searches constituted interferences with their right to respect for private life under Article 8. Such an interference is justified by the terms of paragraph 2 of Article 8 only if it is “in accordance with the law”, pursues one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in paragraph 2 and is “necessary in a democratic society” in order to achieve the aim or aims (see, for example, Liberty and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 58243/00, § 58, ECHR 2008-...)...

70.  No prior judicial authorisation was required for the availability of the power and the possibility of bringing proceedings in the County Court to determine whether the power had been properly and lawfully used was a wholly inadequate safeguard against misuse and arbitrariness. The ex post facto review of the exercise of the power by the County Court in any individual's case did not rectify the lack of legal certainty associated with the power. The applicants' own cases illustrated this point: once the House of Lords had rejected their complaints under the Convention, it was open to the County Court only to determine whether the officers were actually looking for terrorist articles and whether the applicants were obviously not terrorist suspects, a question to which a positive answer was virtually impossible. The removal of the “reasonable suspicion” requirement, or any other objective basis for the search, rendered the citizen extremely vulnerable to an arbitrary exercise of power, restrained only by the police officer's honesty to divulge what type of incriminating article he was looking for on the occasion in question. The lack of any practical and effective safeguards was compounded by the apparent breadth of the definition of “articles of a kind which could be used in connection with terrorism”. There was thus a real risk that the powers might be misused so as to regulate protest or to maintain public order, rather than to counter terrorism. This clearly had far-reaching consequences for civil liberties in the United Kingdom, particularly when, at the material time, the authorisation covered the whole of the Metropolitan Police District; had been continuously renewed every month for almost six years; and when there was no requirement that the authorisation be necessary or suitable, but only “expedient”, for preventing terrorism...

76.  The Court recalls its well established case-law that the words “in accordance with the law” require the impugned measure both to have some basis in domestic law and to be compatible with the rule of law, which is expressly mentioned in the preamble to the Convention and inherent in the object and purpose of Article 8. The law must thus be adequately accessible and foreseeable, that is, formulated with sufficient precision to enable the individual - if need be with appropriate advice - to regulate his conduct (S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, §§ 95 and 96, ECHR 2008-...).

77.  For domestic law to meet these requirements it must afford a measure of legal protection against arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights safeguarded by the Convention. In matters affecting fundamental rights it would be contrary to the rule of law, one of the basic principles of a democratic society enshrined in the Convention, for a legal discretion granted to the executive to be expressed in terms of an unfettered power. Consequently, the law must indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercis...

80.  The Court notes at the outset that the senior police officer referred to in section 44(4) of the Act is empowered to authorise any constable in uniform to stop and search a pedestrian in any area specified by him within his jurisdiction if he “considers it expedient for the prevention of acts of terrorism”. However, “expedient” means no more than “advantageous” or “helpful”. There is no requirement at the authorisation stage that the stop and search power be considered “necessary” and therefore no requirement of any assessment of the proportionality of the measure. The authorisation is subject to confirmation by the Secretary of State within 48 hours. The Secretary of State may not alter the geographical coverage of an authorisation and although he or she can refuse confirmation or substitute an earlier time of expiry, it appears that in practice this has never been done. Although the exercise of the powers of authorisation and confirmation is subject to judicial review, the width of the statutory powers is such that applicants face formidable obstacles in showing that any authorisation and confirmation are ultra vires or an abuse of power...

83.  Of still further concern is the breadth of the discretion conferred on the individual police officer. The officer is obliged, in carrying out the search, to comply with the terms of the Code. However, the Code governs essentially the mode in which the stop and search is carried out, rather than providing any restriction on the officer's decision to stop and search. That decision is, as the House of Lords made clear, one based exclusively on the “hunch” or “professional intuition” of the officer concerned (see paragraph 23 above). Not only is it unnecessary for him to demonstrate the existence of any reasonable suspicion; he is not required even subjectively to suspect anything about the person stopped and searched. The sole proviso is that the search must be for the purpose of looking for articles which could be used in connection with terrorism, a very wide category which could cover many articles commonly carried by people in the streets.  Provided the person concerned is stopped for the purpose of searching for such articles, the police officer does not even have to have grounds for suspecting the presence of such articles. As noted by Lord Brown in the House of Lords, the stop and search power provided for by section 44 “radically ... departs from our traditional understanding of the limits of police power” (see paragraph 23 above)...

85.  In the Court's view, there is a clear risk of arbitrariness in the grant of such a broad discretion to the police officer...

86.  The Government argue that safeguards against abuse are provided by the right of an individual to challenge a stop and search by way of judicial review or an action in damages. But the limitations of both actions are clearly demonstrated by the present case. In particular, in the absence of any obligation on the part of the officer to show a reasonable suspicion, it is likely to be difficult if not impossible to prove that the power was improperly exercised.

87.  In conclusion, the Court considers that the powers of authorisation and confirmation as well as those of stop and search under sections 44 and 45 of the 2000 Act are neither sufficiently circumscribed nor subject to adequate legal safeguards against abuse. They are not, therefore, “in accordance with the law” and it follows that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention."

The judgment is worth reading in full and constitutes another significant defeat to the UK government's surveillance state "solution" to the not insignificant problem of terrorism.

Update: Nice commentary from Hawtalk.

"In summary, the Home Office's human rights team is not very good because human rights are not its main function. The Home Office exists to support immigration, policing and national security – all the organisations that need powers to invade privacy  - it needs privacy protection like it needs a hole in the head.
It is therefore  not surprising that Home Office legislation provides for wide ranging powers to help "their agencies" and the bare minimum when drafting provisions that protect individuals from misuse of these powers."

Terrorball

A blast of common sensefrom Prof Paul Campos in the WSJ on governments' responses to terrorism.

"The world's greatest nation seems bent on subjecting itself to a similarly humiliating defeat, by playing a game that could be called Terrorball. The first two rules of Terrorball are:
(1) The game lasts as long as there are terrorists who want to harm Americans; and
(2) If terrorists should manage to kill or injure or seriously frighten any of us, they win...

As to the question of what the government should do rather than keep playing Terrorball, the answer is simple: stop treating Americans like idiots and cowards.
It might be unrealistic to expect the average citizen to have a nuanced grasp of statistically based risk analysis, but there is nothing nuanced about two basic facts:
(1) America is a country of 310 million people, in which thousands of horrible things happen every single day; and
(2) The chances that one of those horrible things will be that you're subjected to a terrorist attack can, for all practical purposes, be calculated as zero."

Recommended.

Landmark ECHR ruling on human trafficking

From the ECHR blog comes news of an important ruling on human trafficking.

"Yesterday, the European Court passed a landmark judgment on human trafficking in the case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia. The case concerned the death of Oxana Rantseva and was brought by her father. Oxana moved from Russia to Cyprus and started to work as a 'cabaret artiste', as one of thousands of women coming to Cyprus. It was widely known that these 'artistes' were in practice mostly working as prostitutes. Within a few weeks she left the place where she worked, but was traced by her employer who brought her to the police with the aim of haiving her detained and extradited, so that he could employ someone else. The police noted that she was not illegally staying in Cyprus, but had a work permit and made her go back with her employer. Later that night, she tried to escape from the apartment where her employer was keeping her and in doing so fell of a balcony and died. In spite of the mysterious circumstances of her death, the context of possible human trafficking was never looked into by the authorities.

The Court found, unanimously, that trafficking in human beings, although not epxlicitly mentioned in the ECHR, fell within the scope of Article 4 (prohibition of slavery, servitude and forced labour). This is a rarely used Convention provision, on which there is only one earlier Court judgment in the context of human trafficking: the case of Siliadin v. France (Appl.no. 73316/01) of 2005, in which the Court looked into a situation of girl from Africa held in servitude as a housemaid in France...

The judgment not only represents a milestone in the combat against human trafficking, but more generally elucidates state obligations in the battle against transational crime. It is commendable that the Court through its verdict offers new yardsticks to assess state performance in this respect.

To read the report by Interights on the case click here. This NGO also submitted a third pary submission to the Court, which can be read here. Even the Wall Street Journal reports on the case; click here."

The backfiring of the surveillance state

Glenn Greenwald: The backfiring of the surveillance state

"Every debate over expanded government surveillance power is invariably framed as one of "security v. privacy and civil liberties" -- as though it's a given that increasing the Government's surveillance authorities will "make us safer."  But it has long been clear that the opposite is true.  As numerous experts (such as Rep. Rush Holt) have attempted, with futility, to explain, expanding the scope of raw intelligence data collected by our national security agencies invariably impedes rather than bolsters efforts to detect terrorist plots.  This is true for two reasons:  (1) eliminating strict content limits on what can be surveilled (along with enforcement safeguards, such as judicial warrants) means that government agents spend substantial time scrutinizing and sorting through communications and other information that have nothing to do with terrorism; and (2) increasing the quantity of what is collected makes it more difficult to find information relevant to actual terrorism plots."

Recommended.