Friday, June 25, 2004
The INDUCE (Inducement Devolves into Unlawful Child Exploitation) act has had a change of name. It is now to be called the Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004. Ernest Miller made his own notes on Senator Hatch's justifications for the bill. Extract (Ernest's comments are in brackets bold and italics):
"A secondary-liability rule that punishes only control also punishes consumers: It encourages designers to avoid “control” by shifting risks onto consumers. [Whereas laws that punish control AND intent punish consumers by eliminating types of software many consumers use quite legitimately. It also punishes consumers by taxing innovation and turning technology development over to Hollywood. Another, less drastic solution would be for the government to sponsor a consumer education program, like those "no smoking" ads. Heck, why should government do it? If Hollywood is so concerned with the consumers, let them pay for an education campaign.] For example, Napster incurred billion-dollar liability because it controlled computers housing a search index that located infringing files. Programs like Kazaa avoid Napster’s “control” by moving their search indices onto computers owned by unsuspecting consumers. [Unsuspecting consumers or willful infringers? Which is it, Senator? If the consumers are unsuspecting, shouldn't we be considering a law absolving them of liability as well?] ...
...But a fallacy lurks here: The “direct infringers” at issue are not the traditional targets for copyright enforcement. [Why is "direct infringers" in quotes? Are they direct infringers or not?] In fact, they are children [Will someone please think of the children?] and consumers: They are the hundreds of millions [Hundreds of millions. That is an awful lot of "direct infringers." Certainly a higher estimate of infringers than I have seen before.] of Americans – toddlers to seniors – who use and enjoy the creative works that copyrights have helped create. [Indeed. Perhaps Hatch should pass a law immunizing children and consumers from infringement lawsuits if he is so concerned.]...
...Worse yet, artists must sue their fans for the sin of misusing devices designed to be easy and tempting to misuse. [Yeah, that IM is just totally too tempting. Oh, wait, Hatch is talking about P2P, as he ... well, he actually never defines it.] That is unfair: When inducement is the disease, infringement can be seen as just a symptom. [You're not guilty of infringement - you're just sick. "Hi, I'm Ernest, and I'm an infringer." "Hi, Ernest!"] Yet artists must ignore inducers who profit by chanting, “Hey, kids, infringement is cool, and we will help you get away with it.” [Well, if they are chanting ... oh, wait, the only one chanting is in Palestine, outside of Hatch's reach. The FTC says the ones in the US give adequate warning of the risks.] Instead, artists can only sue kids [Will someone please think of the children?] who succumb to this temptation. They must leave Fagin to his work – and sue Oliver Twist. [The difference being, however, that Fagin has specific knowledge of the specific individuals he is sending out to commit specific crimes. Slightly different case, don't you think?]
Brilliant. I laughed out loud at: You're not guilty of infringement - you're just sick. "Hi, I'm Ernest, and I'm an infringer." "Hi, Ernest!".
With bipartisan support this thing actually has a serious chance of making it into law. The EFF have composed a hypothetical complaint against Apple based on the proposed Act (previously known as INDUCE).
"Apple's iPod music player seemed particularly vulnerable to attack. Any major record label could bring a strong lawsuit against Apple for "intentionally inducing" infringement under this new law with the iPod, both because it's plausible to argue that having an iPod enhances the lure of using P2P to download music (gotta fill all that space!) and because all the major record labels still believe that private sharing of songs from your CDs with friends is copyright infringement. We still disagree with the labels on these points, but the reality is that no court has yet convinced them that their legal theories are flawed. We also threw in Toshiba for making the iPod's hard drive and CNET for showing people how to move the iPod's music files.
Under the Supreme Court's ruling in Sony v. Universal (the Betamax VCR case), devices like the iPod and CD burners are legal as long as they have legal uses—what the Court called "substantial non-infringing uses." This has been the rule in the technology sector for the last 20 years. Billions of dollars and thousands of jobs have depended on it. Industries have blossomed under it. And any case brought against Apple or HP or Dell would be immediately dismissed because of it.
Now Senator Hatch and his allies want to tear down that rule and substitute a new one with the Induce Act. With it, the fact that a device or product has legal uses, even lots of them, is irrelevant. Filing a lawsuit under the Induce Act is like dropping a litigation bomb on any company that gives users products that have even the slightest potential to assist in copyright infringement. Technology companies will avoid being innovative, and investors will avoid supporting new technologies for fear of being sued out of existence based on the possible conduct of their customers. If this bill had been law in 1984, there would be no VCR. If this bill had been law in 1995, there would be no CD burners. If this bill had been law in 2000, there would be no iPod. If this bill becomes law in 2004, we may lose those devices and many more that we haven't even begun to imagine."
"A secondary-liability rule that punishes only control also punishes consumers: It encourages designers to avoid “control” by shifting risks onto consumers. [Whereas laws that punish control AND intent punish consumers by eliminating types of software many consumers use quite legitimately. It also punishes consumers by taxing innovation and turning technology development over to Hollywood. Another, less drastic solution would be for the government to sponsor a consumer education program, like those "no smoking" ads. Heck, why should government do it? If Hollywood is so concerned with the consumers, let them pay for an education campaign.] For example, Napster incurred billion-dollar liability because it controlled computers housing a search index that located infringing files. Programs like Kazaa avoid Napster’s “control” by moving their search indices onto computers owned by unsuspecting consumers. [Unsuspecting consumers or willful infringers? Which is it, Senator? If the consumers are unsuspecting, shouldn't we be considering a law absolving them of liability as well?] ...
...But a fallacy lurks here: The “direct infringers” at issue are not the traditional targets for copyright enforcement. [Why is "direct infringers" in quotes? Are they direct infringers or not?] In fact, they are children [Will someone please think of the children?] and consumers: They are the hundreds of millions [Hundreds of millions. That is an awful lot of "direct infringers." Certainly a higher estimate of infringers than I have seen before.] of Americans – toddlers to seniors – who use and enjoy the creative works that copyrights have helped create. [Indeed. Perhaps Hatch should pass a law immunizing children and consumers from infringement lawsuits if he is so concerned.]...
...Worse yet, artists must sue their fans for the sin of misusing devices designed to be easy and tempting to misuse. [Yeah, that IM is just totally too tempting. Oh, wait, Hatch is talking about P2P, as he ... well, he actually never defines it.] That is unfair: When inducement is the disease, infringement can be seen as just a symptom. [You're not guilty of infringement - you're just sick. "Hi, I'm Ernest, and I'm an infringer." "Hi, Ernest!"] Yet artists must ignore inducers who profit by chanting, “Hey, kids, infringement is cool, and we will help you get away with it.” [Well, if they are chanting ... oh, wait, the only one chanting is in Palestine, outside of Hatch's reach. The FTC says the ones in the US give adequate warning of the risks.] Instead, artists can only sue kids [Will someone please think of the children?] who succumb to this temptation. They must leave Fagin to his work – and sue Oliver Twist. [The difference being, however, that Fagin has specific knowledge of the specific individuals he is sending out to commit specific crimes. Slightly different case, don't you think?]
Brilliant. I laughed out loud at: You're not guilty of infringement - you're just sick. "Hi, I'm Ernest, and I'm an infringer." "Hi, Ernest!".
With bipartisan support this thing actually has a serious chance of making it into law. The EFF have composed a hypothetical complaint against Apple based on the proposed Act (previously known as INDUCE).
"Apple's iPod music player seemed particularly vulnerable to attack. Any major record label could bring a strong lawsuit against Apple for "intentionally inducing" infringement under this new law with the iPod, both because it's plausible to argue that having an iPod enhances the lure of using P2P to download music (gotta fill all that space!) and because all the major record labels still believe that private sharing of songs from your CDs with friends is copyright infringement. We still disagree with the labels on these points, but the reality is that no court has yet convinced them that their legal theories are flawed. We also threw in Toshiba for making the iPod's hard drive and CNET for showing people how to move the iPod's music files.
Under the Supreme Court's ruling in Sony v. Universal (the Betamax VCR case), devices like the iPod and CD burners are legal as long as they have legal uses—what the Court called "substantial non-infringing uses." This has been the rule in the technology sector for the last 20 years. Billions of dollars and thousands of jobs have depended on it. Industries have blossomed under it. And any case brought against Apple or HP or Dell would be immediately dismissed because of it.
Now Senator Hatch and his allies want to tear down that rule and substitute a new one with the Induce Act. With it, the fact that a device or product has legal uses, even lots of them, is irrelevant. Filing a lawsuit under the Induce Act is like dropping a litigation bomb on any company that gives users products that have even the slightest potential to assist in copyright infringement. Technology companies will avoid being innovative, and investors will avoid supporting new technologies for fear of being sued out of existence based on the possible conduct of their customers. If this bill had been law in 1984, there would be no VCR. If this bill had been law in 1995, there would be no CD burners. If this bill had been law in 2000, there would be no iPod. If this bill becomes law in 2004, we may lose those devices and many more that we haven't even begun to imagine."
Thursday, June 24, 2004
It seems that the number of airlines and travel companies sharing passenger information with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) for testing of the passenger screening program CAPPS II was more than was originally thought.
The EU parliament might like to throw that into the mix of their ECJ case against the Commission and Council of Ministers on the agreement to share EU passenger data with the US? No? Never mind. We saw how lively EU democracy is on software patents. Why should a little matter like handing over personal details of EU citizens to a foreign government (albeit a friendly one in this instance) give rise for concern? Well from my perspective the reason would be just to demonstrate a remote semblance of respectability of the institutions of the EU and their ability to answer basic questions related to the new constitution and its gaurantee of the charter of fundamental rights. Of course the agreement was concluded before the constitution (which, of course, may well fall apart depending on the results of national referenda). But even without the constitution the EU theoretically offers fundamental gaurantees on privacy which in the past have led to the brink of a trade war with the US, on the issue of how US companies would be required to handle data about European citizens flowing into the US.
In March 2000, after nearly two years of negotiations, the EU and the US reached a tentative agreement on the processing of personal data. The EU Data Protection Directive (Article 25) requires that personal data shall not be transferred to a country outside the EU unless that country "ensures an adequate level of protection." The Directive theoretically guarantees a high standard of personal data privacy for EU citizens. The US was considered by the EU to lack an adequate level of protection.
The negotiators were reportedly trying to work out a way for US companies to meet EU standards of privacy. The Europeans agreed to the Americans' proposed "safe harbour." US companies would sign up to this safe harbour by agreeing to follow certain restrictions on how they processed personal data. They would register with the US Department of Commerce and there would be "adequate enforcement" of the restrictions the companies agreed to. The US Commerce Secretary, William Daley, described the agreement as a "carefully constructed and well-implemented system of self-regulation" which could protect privacy rights.
Critics at the time accused the European negotiators of caving in, since self regulation by industry was what they were trying to avoid. Many EU nation states had not implemented the directive at the time of the negotiations, however. The US therefore had a legitimate complaint - how could they be expected to accept data flow restrictions required by EU law but not yet appropriately implemented there? The European Commission, at the time, was in the process of suing Germany, France, the Netherlands, Ireland and Luxembourg in the European court over their failure to implement the directive.
Critics of the agreement on transfer of passenger data have criticised Commissioner Bolkstein, not of caving in, but of deceit and underhand deals with the US in dark smoky rooms. On this occasion, I can understand the critics' point of view.
The EU parliament might like to throw that into the mix of their ECJ case against the Commission and Council of Ministers on the agreement to share EU passenger data with the US? No? Never mind. We saw how lively EU democracy is on software patents. Why should a little matter like handing over personal details of EU citizens to a foreign government (albeit a friendly one in this instance) give rise for concern? Well from my perspective the reason would be just to demonstrate a remote semblance of respectability of the institutions of the EU and their ability to answer basic questions related to the new constitution and its gaurantee of the charter of fundamental rights. Of course the agreement was concluded before the constitution (which, of course, may well fall apart depending on the results of national referenda). But even without the constitution the EU theoretically offers fundamental gaurantees on privacy which in the past have led to the brink of a trade war with the US, on the issue of how US companies would be required to handle data about European citizens flowing into the US.
In March 2000, after nearly two years of negotiations, the EU and the US reached a tentative agreement on the processing of personal data. The EU Data Protection Directive (Article 25) requires that personal data shall not be transferred to a country outside the EU unless that country "ensures an adequate level of protection." The Directive theoretically guarantees a high standard of personal data privacy for EU citizens. The US was considered by the EU to lack an adequate level of protection.
The negotiators were reportedly trying to work out a way for US companies to meet EU standards of privacy. The Europeans agreed to the Americans' proposed "safe harbour." US companies would sign up to this safe harbour by agreeing to follow certain restrictions on how they processed personal data. They would register with the US Department of Commerce and there would be "adequate enforcement" of the restrictions the companies agreed to. The US Commerce Secretary, William Daley, described the agreement as a "carefully constructed and well-implemented system of self-regulation" which could protect privacy rights.
Critics at the time accused the European negotiators of caving in, since self regulation by industry was what they were trying to avoid. Many EU nation states had not implemented the directive at the time of the negotiations, however. The US therefore had a legitimate complaint - how could they be expected to accept data flow restrictions required by EU law but not yet appropriately implemented there? The European Commission, at the time, was in the process of suing Germany, France, the Netherlands, Ireland and Luxembourg in the European court over their failure to implement the directive.
Critics of the agreement on transfer of passenger data have criticised Commissioner Bolkstein, not of caving in, but of deceit and underhand deals with the US in dark smoky rooms. On this occasion, I can understand the critics' point of view.
Wednesday, June 23, 2004
Spiked have a positive review of Dr Mike Fitzpatrick's new book, MMR and Autism: What parents need to know.
Clay Shirky on DNA, P2P, and Privacy. In the privacy debate about ubiquitous centralised databases,
"Databases have two key weaknesses...The first is that they deal badly with ambiguity, and generally have to issue a unique number, sometimes called a primary key, to every entity they store information on. The US Social Security number is a primary key that points to you,...second weakness: since each database maintains its own set of primary keys, creating interoperability between different databases is difficult and expensive, and generally requires significant advance coordination...
Privacy advocates have relied on these weaknesses in creating legal encumbrances to issuing and sharing primary keys. They believe, rightly, that widely shared primary keys pose a danger to privacy. (The recent case of Princeton using its high school applicants' Social Security numbers to log in to the Yale admittance database highlights these dangers.) The current worst-case scenario is a single universal database in which all records -- federal, state, and local, public and private -- would be unified with a single set of primary keys.
New technology brings new challenges however, and in the database world the new challenge is not a single unified database, but rather decentralized interoperability, interoperability brought about by a single universally used ID. The ID is DNA. The interoperability comes from the curious and unique advantages DNA has as a primary key. And the effect will put privacy advocates in a position analogous to that of the RIAA, forcing them to switch from fighting the creation of a single central database to fighting a decentralized and interoperable system of peer-to-peer information storage."
"Databases have two key weaknesses...The first is that they deal badly with ambiguity, and generally have to issue a unique number, sometimes called a primary key, to every entity they store information on. The US Social Security number is a primary key that points to you,...second weakness: since each database maintains its own set of primary keys, creating interoperability between different databases is difficult and expensive, and generally requires significant advance coordination...
Privacy advocates have relied on these weaknesses in creating legal encumbrances to issuing and sharing primary keys. They believe, rightly, that widely shared primary keys pose a danger to privacy. (The recent case of Princeton using its high school applicants' Social Security numbers to log in to the Yale admittance database highlights these dangers.) The current worst-case scenario is a single universal database in which all records -- federal, state, and local, public and private -- would be unified with a single set of primary keys.
New technology brings new challenges however, and in the database world the new challenge is not a single unified database, but rather decentralized interoperability, interoperability brought about by a single universally used ID. The ID is DNA. The interoperability comes from the curious and unique advantages DNA has as a primary key. And the effect will put privacy advocates in a position analogous to that of the RIAA, forcing them to switch from fighting the creation of a single central database to fighting a decentralized and interoperable system of peer-to-peer information storage."
Microsoft are suing, for defamation, the Brazilian government official promoting open source software use in the public services, Sergio Amadeu. His alleged crime is that he was too nasty when criticising Microsoft because they had
" a ‘drug-dealer practice’ for offering the operational system Windows to some governments and cities for digital inclusion programs. ‘This is a trojan horse, a form of securing critical mass to continue constraining the country’.”
" a ‘drug-dealer practice’ for offering the operational system Windows to some governments and cities for digital inclusion programs. ‘This is a trojan horse, a form of securing critical mass to continue constraining the country’.”
David Blunkett, UK Home Secretary, is the "Judicial equivalent of a football hooligan" according to Simon Jenkins in the Times.
The Washington Post had an article about RFID tags yesterday. It's the usual stuff about the potential of RFIDs to improve business and the worries of privacy advicates. But the thing that jumped out at me as an absolute classic misunderstanding was this:
'"If you know quickly who is in the area, you can customize their experience," said Paul McKeown, who heads IBM's global smart-card efforts. McKeown said he was inspired by an experience his mother had in her small town in England, where for years she was banking at the same branch and one day wasn't recognized and was challenged by a new teller.'
If ever there were folk "who didn't get it" about technology, it is people with this kind of attitude. The whole point about the small town where the banking staff knew and cared about the customers was that people were put in touch with and cared about people. No amount of technology facilitating a "customised experience" can bridge the unmeasurable qualitative difference between treating a person as a person and treating them as a customised number to be processed in accordance with the instructions on the employee's screen.
As Cory said in his DRM speech at Microsoft, "New media don't succeed because they're like the old media, only better: they succeed because they're worse than the old media at the stuff the old media is good at, and better at the stuff the old media are bad at." I'd like to offer an extension to this - new methods and technologies do not succeed because they are like people only better, they suceed because they are worse than people at the stuff people are good at (caring) and better at the stuff people are bad at (rapidly processing and moving around billions of bits). Try not to get confused about that. It's important.
The thing that makes my own organisation, the Open University, so unique and special was that we put people in touch with people. We recognised, 35 years ago, that the way for open and distance university education to work for students with no prior qualifications was to put good people (vast numbers in the OU) in touch with good people with unrecognised potential (our students) and that we could be all-inclusive. We've had well over a million graduates since then, many of whom would never have had the opportunity to take a university degree.
The thing that makes the Internet so special is that it puts people in touch with people. Sure it is a bottomless sink of information and a useful communications infrastructure for commerce but the key is that it is a many to many communcations medium putting people in touch with people.
I'll stop there lest I be accused of becoming too evangelistic...
'"If you know quickly who is in the area, you can customize their experience," said Paul McKeown, who heads IBM's global smart-card efforts. McKeown said he was inspired by an experience his mother had in her small town in England, where for years she was banking at the same branch and one day wasn't recognized and was challenged by a new teller.'
If ever there were folk "who didn't get it" about technology, it is people with this kind of attitude. The whole point about the small town where the banking staff knew and cared about the customers was that people were put in touch with and cared about people. No amount of technology facilitating a "customised experience" can bridge the unmeasurable qualitative difference between treating a person as a person and treating them as a customised number to be processed in accordance with the instructions on the employee's screen.
As Cory said in his DRM speech at Microsoft, "New media don't succeed because they're like the old media, only better: they succeed because they're worse than the old media at the stuff the old media is good at, and better at the stuff the old media are bad at." I'd like to offer an extension to this - new methods and technologies do not succeed because they are like people only better, they suceed because they are worse than people at the stuff people are good at (caring) and better at the stuff people are bad at (rapidly processing and moving around billions of bits). Try not to get confused about that. It's important.
The thing that makes my own organisation, the Open University, so unique and special was that we put people in touch with people. We recognised, 35 years ago, that the way for open and distance university education to work for students with no prior qualifications was to put good people (vast numbers in the OU) in touch with good people with unrecognised potential (our students) and that we could be all-inclusive. We've had well over a million graduates since then, many of whom would never have had the opportunity to take a university degree.
The thing that makes the Internet so special is that it puts people in touch with people. Sure it is a bottomless sink of information and a useful communications infrastructure for commerce but the key is that it is a many to many communcations medium putting people in touch with people.
I'll stop there lest I be accused of becoming too evangelistic...
Tuesday, June 22, 2004
It seems as if the Dutch parliament may consider revoking its support for the EU software patent directive because the Dutch minister responsible for agreeing to the directive in the Council of Ministers and for educating the parliament on the matter, Mr Brinkhorst, er ever so slightly misled them, or should I say "misinformed" them. He suggested in a letter to the Dutch parliament in advance of the vote in the Council of Ministers that there was "agreement" between the EU Parliament and the Commission on the issue, when the two were basically at loggerheads.
I won't suggest that Mr Brinkhorst lied as it would not be appropriate especially since there is a good bet that many of his contemporaries around the EU were equally "informative" with regard to educating their national parliaments on the matter.
The transcript of the discussions in the council of ministers makes interesting reading, if only for those seriously enmeshed in the ethics and politics of sw patents but the final part of this democratic discussion is a classic case of the Irish (IE)chairwoman pushing for the rubber stamping of the business at hand, regardless of the substance of the business.
"IE: And Denmark? Can I hear from Denmark please?
Denmark: I would really like to ask the commission why they couldn't accept the last sentence put forward by the Italians. It was in the original German proposal.
(19:13) IE: I think the Commissioner already answered that question, I'm sorry Denmark. So are you yes, no, abstain?
DK: I think we wouldn't, we're not hap...
IE: Can I assume you're a "yes"?
DK: We're not happy
IE: But are you 80% happy?
DK: But... I think we...
IE: We don't need you you to be totally happy. None of us are totally happy.
DK: I know that, I know that.
IE: If we were, we wouldn't be here
DK: I think we're not very happy, but I think we would, we would...
IE: Thank you very much
DK: ... we would like to see a solution today.
IE: Thank you very much, Denmark.
(19:45) IE: Spain, are you abstention or no?
ES: Sorry, no.
IE: Thank you Spain, Austria?
AT: Abstention.
(20:03) IE: Well, Ladies and Gentlemen, I'm happy to say that we have a qualified majority, so thank you all very very much indeed, and thank you to commissioner Bolkestein.
IE: France... The vote is over France, no more ... for France please
FR: I didn't want to cause confusion. I'm so happy that we've managed to reach this result thanks to your hard work and that of the Commission. I just wanted to say that I'd like to propose a declaration using the words I used in my first statement. A declaration appended to the Council minutes.
(21:04) IE: Yes, thank you France, it's fine."
Democracy in action. I particularly like the "We don't need you you to be totally happy. None of us are totally happy." I'm almost relieved that the Irish presidency of the EU is coming to an end.
I won't suggest that Mr Brinkhorst lied as it would not be appropriate especially since there is a good bet that many of his contemporaries around the EU were equally "informative" with regard to educating their national parliaments on the matter.
The transcript of the discussions in the council of ministers makes interesting reading, if only for those seriously enmeshed in the ethics and politics of sw patents but the final part of this democratic discussion is a classic case of the Irish (IE)chairwoman pushing for the rubber stamping of the business at hand, regardless of the substance of the business.
"IE: And Denmark? Can I hear from Denmark please?
Denmark: I would really like to ask the commission why they couldn't accept the last sentence put forward by the Italians. It was in the original German proposal.
(19:13) IE: I think the Commissioner already answered that question, I'm sorry Denmark. So are you yes, no, abstain?
DK: I think we wouldn't, we're not hap...
IE: Can I assume you're a "yes"?
DK: We're not happy
IE: But are you 80% happy?
DK: But... I think we...
IE: We don't need you you to be totally happy. None of us are totally happy.
DK: I know that, I know that.
IE: If we were, we wouldn't be here
DK: I think we're not very happy, but I think we would, we would...
IE: Thank you very much
DK: ... we would like to see a solution today.
IE: Thank you very much, Denmark.
(19:45) IE: Spain, are you abstention or no?
ES: Sorry, no.
IE: Thank you Spain, Austria?
AT: Abstention.
(20:03) IE: Well, Ladies and Gentlemen, I'm happy to say that we have a qualified majority, so thank you all very very much indeed, and thank you to commissioner Bolkestein.
IE: France... The vote is over France, no more ... for France please
FR: I didn't want to cause confusion. I'm so happy that we've managed to reach this result thanks to your hard work and that of the Commission. I just wanted to say that I'd like to propose a declaration using the words I used in my first statement. A declaration appended to the Council minutes.
(21:04) IE: Yes, thank you France, it's fine."
Democracy in action. I particularly like the "We don't need you you to be totally happy. None of us are totally happy." I'm almost relieved that the Irish presidency of the EU is coming to an end.
Siva's Response to a Senate Staffer on the p2p question,
"I have too much to say about p2p. And my opinions are beyond the pro and con simplifications that get laid out in newspapers...
...Copyright is by design a leaky regulatory system. If the leaks are too big, copyright fails to generate incentives. If they are too small, copyright fails to allow for democratic creativity and sharing -- the essence of culture. So managing leaks is important. But freaking out about them is counterproductive. So far, the content industries have been better at freaking than managing. And we are all worse off because of that...
...The best way to approach this issue is through serious and sincere ethical deliberation. That means avoiding harsh moralizing, threats of criminal or civil action, and blunt technological moves that will only create more problems and ill-will. The goal should be flourishing democratic culture and creativity. It should not be the artificial support of poorly run media companies. Nor should it be the unfettered proliferation of machines and code for the sake of more machines and code. We must be modest and patient -- an unpopular stance in this age of extremes."
Beautifully put.
"I have too much to say about p2p. And my opinions are beyond the pro and con simplifications that get laid out in newspapers...
...Copyright is by design a leaky regulatory system. If the leaks are too big, copyright fails to generate incentives. If they are too small, copyright fails to allow for democratic creativity and sharing -- the essence of culture. So managing leaks is important. But freaking out about them is counterproductive. So far, the content industries have been better at freaking than managing. And we are all worse off because of that...
...The best way to approach this issue is through serious and sincere ethical deliberation. That means avoiding harsh moralizing, threats of criminal or civil action, and blunt technological moves that will only create more problems and ill-will. The goal should be flourishing democratic culture and creativity. It should not be the artificial support of poorly run media companies. Nor should it be the unfettered proliferation of machines and code for the sake of more machines and code. We must be modest and patient -- an unpopular stance in this age of extremes."
Beautifully put.
Rather an obscure case relating to the 4th and 5th amendments to the US constitution was decided by the Supreme Court yesterday.
It about someone having a row in a truck with his daughter, who was stopped by the police (who had been tipped off about the row) and refusing to give his name to the officer who requested it. He was prosecuted and fined $250. Technically what was under scrutiny was the man's right not to incriminate himself (5th) and his right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure (4th). Plus, presumably his right to remain silent. The court decided 5-4 against the man's assertion of his right to remain silent in the circumstances.
Michael Froomkin briefly looks at the technicalities. Apparently it's quite a narrowly tailored decision which need not necessarily have wider implications than the specific case (though Froomkin suggests it might be a slippery slope).
Under a 1968 Supreme Court decision police are allowed to hold someone briefly (called a "Terry stop" after the case) in order to obtain more information, which seems fair enough. The thing that interested me about this particular case, though, is not the specific technicalities but the question of latent ambiguity. Presumably the justices in 1968 had an idea in their heads about the kind of information that an officer could find out about an individual during a brief detention. It would be fairly limited e.g. any parking tickets, was the vehicle stolen, did he match a suspect's description, was someone of that name wanted etc. 36 years on, however, with vasts amounts of information on everybody collected in public and private and networked databases makes the kind of information it is possible to find out about an individual, in a short space of time, qualitatively of a completely different order.
Should not the modern day justices be exploring the boundaries of the information it should be possible to find out? The decision doesn't affect us directly this side of the Atlantic and it would seem on the surface that there are no technological questions at issue in the case but this is a pretty clear example, imho, of where technology has changed things to such a degree that the questions it raises are not solved by a narrow mechanical application of existing laws (whether or not that mechanical application itself would/could provide grounds for dispute).
EPIC have a webpage devoted to the case.
It about someone having a row in a truck with his daughter, who was stopped by the police (who had been tipped off about the row) and refusing to give his name to the officer who requested it. He was prosecuted and fined $250. Technically what was under scrutiny was the man's right not to incriminate himself (5th) and his right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure (4th). Plus, presumably his right to remain silent. The court decided 5-4 against the man's assertion of his right to remain silent in the circumstances.
Michael Froomkin briefly looks at the technicalities. Apparently it's quite a narrowly tailored decision which need not necessarily have wider implications than the specific case (though Froomkin suggests it might be a slippery slope).
Under a 1968 Supreme Court decision police are allowed to hold someone briefly (called a "Terry stop" after the case) in order to obtain more information, which seems fair enough. The thing that interested me about this particular case, though, is not the specific technicalities but the question of latent ambiguity. Presumably the justices in 1968 had an idea in their heads about the kind of information that an officer could find out about an individual during a brief detention. It would be fairly limited e.g. any parking tickets, was the vehicle stolen, did he match a suspect's description, was someone of that name wanted etc. 36 years on, however, with vasts amounts of information on everybody collected in public and private and networked databases makes the kind of information it is possible to find out about an individual, in a short space of time, qualitatively of a completely different order.
Should not the modern day justices be exploring the boundaries of the information it should be possible to find out? The decision doesn't affect us directly this side of the Atlantic and it would seem on the surface that there are no technological questions at issue in the case but this is a pretty clear example, imho, of where technology has changed things to such a degree that the questions it raises are not solved by a narrow mechanical application of existing laws (whether or not that mechanical application itself would/could provide grounds for dispute).
EPIC have a webpage devoted to the case.
Monday, June 21, 2004
Some folks have added some links into Cory Doctorow's DRM talk to Microsoft researchers. Just a sample of what can be done to improve public domain work and facilitate open source learning and free flow of information.
Steven Wu at Lawmeme has been at a convention on the constitution and thinking of the use of software for gerrymandering, discussed by one panel.
"Almost every panelist at one point mentioned a piece of software that has become popular in state legislatures: Caliper's Maptitude for Redistricting, which the website advertises as:
'a special edition of Caliper Corporation's Maptitude GIS for Windows that includes everything you need to build and analyze redistricting plans. As you assign area features to a district, the district boundaries are redrawn and selected attributes are automatically summarized to reflect the district's characteristics.'
Basically, as one of the panelists put it today, Maptitude allows you to do just about anything you want with a redistricting plan, once you plug in the demographic data. You want districts that are as evenly balanced politically/racially/genderly as possible? How about a lot of majority-minority districts? How about districts that will protect incumbents, by filling them with people of the incumbents' political party? Whatever your preferences, Maptitude can generate the appropriate redistricting lines in half an hour or less."
...An unseen part of the evoting story that not too many people have been registering.
"Almost every panelist at one point mentioned a piece of software that has become popular in state legislatures: Caliper's Maptitude for Redistricting, which the website advertises as:
'a special edition of Caliper Corporation's Maptitude GIS for Windows that includes everything you need to build and analyze redistricting plans. As you assign area features to a district, the district boundaries are redrawn and selected attributes are automatically summarized to reflect the district's characteristics.'
Basically, as one of the panelists put it today, Maptitude allows you to do just about anything you want with a redistricting plan, once you plug in the demographic data. You want districts that are as evenly balanced politically/racially/genderly as possible? How about a lot of majority-minority districts? How about districts that will protect incumbents, by filling them with people of the incumbents' political party? Whatever your preferences, Maptitude can generate the appropriate redistricting lines in half an hour or less."
...An unseen part of the evoting story that not too many people have been registering.
Friday, June 18, 2004
The OECD has published their 386 page "Privacy Online" report. Definitely not bedtime reading but could have important policy implications. It's based on an OECD ministerial declaration from 1998 on the "Protection of Privacy on Global Networks" with the objective of ensuring "the effective protection of privacy and personal data as well as the continued transborder flow of personal data on global networks."
You could be forgiven for going "Pardon?" at that point.
Chapter 3, pages 27 - 35 gives the meat of the guidelines.
Legislation and self regulation each have advantages and disadvantages etc. OECD work suggests a mix of the two is best etc. Involvement of all is the key etc. OECD member countries should:
Ensure organisations adoption of privacy policies through internal review and linking to OECD site.
Ensure organisations post privacy policies online by encouraging them to do so and auditing them.
Ensure availability of enforcement and redress mechanisms in case of breach of privacy policies by encouraging the use of online alternative dispute mechanisms and actively fostering compliance with privacy policies by raising organisations' awareness..."
Sorry folks but I stopped at that point. This document does not actually appear to be saying anything at all about privacy or information flows in practice. Some people I have a great deal of respect for, like Ian Lloyd at the University of Strathclyde, are noted as having been involved in its production, so I'm sure there is more to it than the first 30 pages appear to promise (Prof Lloyd is mentioned re Chpt 14) but I'm going to allow somebody else to do the leg work on extracting the relevant information.
You could be forgiven for going "Pardon?" at that point.
Chapter 3, pages 27 - 35 gives the meat of the guidelines.
Legislation and self regulation each have advantages and disadvantages etc. OECD work suggests a mix of the two is best etc. Involvement of all is the key etc. OECD member countries should:
Ensure organisations adoption of privacy policies through internal review and linking to OECD site.
Ensure organisations post privacy policies online by encouraging them to do so and auditing them.
Ensure availability of enforcement and redress mechanisms in case of breach of privacy policies by encouraging the use of online alternative dispute mechanisms and actively fostering compliance with privacy policies by raising organisations' awareness..."
Sorry folks but I stopped at that point. This document does not actually appear to be saying anything at all about privacy or information flows in practice. Some people I have a great deal of respect for, like Ian Lloyd at the University of Strathclyde, are noted as having been involved in its production, so I'm sure there is more to it than the first 30 pages appear to promise (Prof Lloyd is mentioned re Chpt 14) but I'm going to allow somebody else to do the leg work on extracting the relevant information.
Can't wait to see the reaction of the libertarians to the news that a French court has fined AOL for 21 abusive and 11 illegal contract terms. It will be the usual outrage I would expect.
"the contracts said AOL could break the agreement without warning, while customers had no way of ending the relationship without paying a penalty."
'By their own', 'hoist' and 'petard' come to mind but not necessarily in that order.
"the contracts said AOL could break the agreement without warning, while customers had no way of ending the relationship without paying a penalty."
'By their own', 'hoist' and 'petard' come to mind but not necessarily in that order.
Cory Doctorow gave a great speech at Microsoft yesterday about digital rights management (DRM). A taster
"Here's what I'm here to convince you of:
1. That DRM systems don't work
2. That DRM systems are bad for society
3. That DRM systems are bad for business
4. That DRM systems are bad for artists
5. That DRM is a bad business-move for MSFT"
And that was just for starters. It's a bit esoteric if you have not been following the drm and copyright wars but still well worth a read.
"Cryptography -- secret writing -- is the practice of keeping
secrets. It involves three parties: a sender, a receiver and an
attacker (actually, there can be more attackers, senders and
recipients, but let's keep this simple). We usually call these
people Alice, Bob and Carol...
...with dual-key crypto it becomes a lot easier for Alice and Bob to keep their keys secret from Carol, even if they've never met...
...Now, let's apply this to DRM.
In DRM, the attacker is *also the recipient*. It's not Alice and
Bob and Carol, it's just Alice and Bob. Alice sells Bob a DVD.
She sells Bob a DVD player. The DVD has a movie on it -- say,
Pirates of the Caribbean -- and it's enciphered with an algorithm
called CSS -- Content Scrambling System. The DVD player has a CSS
un-scrambler.
Now, let's take stock of what's a secret here: the cipher is
well-known. The ciphertext is most assuredly in enemy hands, arrr.
So what? As long as the key is secret from the attacker, we're
golden.
But there's the rub. Alice wants Bob to buy Pirates of the
Caribbean from her. Bob will only buy Pirates of the Caribbean if
he can descramble the CSS-encrypted VOB -- video object -- on his
DVD player. Otherwise, the disc is only useful to Bob as a
drinks-coaster. So Alice has to provide Bob -- the attacker --
with the key, the cipher and the ciphertext.
Hilarity ensues...
...At the end of the day,
all DRM systems share a common vulnerability: they provide their
attackers with ciphertext, the cipher and the key. At this point,
the secret isn't a secret anymore...
...Here's the social reason that DRM fails: keeping an honest user
honest is like keeping a tall user tall. DRM vendors tell us that
their technology is meant to be proof against average users, not
organized criminal gangs like the Ukranian pirates who stamp out
millions of high-quality counterfeits. It's not meant to be proof
against sophisticated college kids. It's not meant to be proof
against anyone who knows how to edit her registry, or hold down
the shift key at the right moment, or use a search engine. At the
end of the day, the user DRM is meant to defend against is the
most unsophisticated and least capable among us."
Next he tells a story of an honest user a young mum who to avoid the kids getting jam on an expensive DVD tries to make a VHS copy, so that when that gets thoroughly kidified she can copy it again for their use and not have to fork out for another expensive copy of the DVD. This story rings very true with me. I've had to replace one of my son's favourite CDs four times in six years and I only count myself lucky that it has still been commercially available. Cory goes on:
"what this person will do in the long run: she'll find out about
Kazaa and the next time she wants to get a movie for the kids,
she'll download it from the net and burn it for them.
In order to delay that day for as long as possible, our lawmakers
and big rightsholder interests have come up with a disastrous
policy called anticircumvention.
Here's how anticircumvention works: if you put a lock -- an
access control -- around a copyrighted work, it is illegal to
break that lock. It's illegal to make a tool that breaks that
lock. It's illegal to tell someone how to make that tool. It's
illegal to tell someone where she can find out how to make that
tool.
Remember Schneier's Law? Anyone can come up with a security
system so clever that he can't see its flaws. The only way to
find the flaws in security is to disclose the system's workings
and invite public feedback. But now we live in a world where any
cipher used to fence off a copyrighted work is off-limits to that
kind of feedback. That's something that a Princeton engineering
prof named Ed Felten discovered when he submitted a paper to an
academic conference on the failings in the Secure Digital Music
Initiative, a watermarking scheme proposed by the recording
industry. The RIAA responded by threatening to sue his ass if he
tried it. We fought them because Ed is the kind of client that
impact litigators love: unimpeachable and clean-cut and the RIAA
folded. Lucky Ed. Maybe the next guy isn't so lucky...
...Here are the two most important things to know about computers
and the Internet:
1. A computer is a machine for rearranging bits
2. The Internet is a machine for moving bits from one place to
another very cheaply and quickly
Any new medium that takes hold on the Internet and with computers
will embrace these two facts, not regret them. A newspaper press
is a machine for spitting out cheap and smeary newsprint at
speed: if you try to make it output fine art lithos, you'll get
junk. If you try to make it output newspapers, you'll get the
basis for a free society.
And so it is with the Internet...
...
New media don't succeed because they're like the only media, only
better: they succeed because they're worse than the old media at
the stuff the old media is good at, and better at the stuff the
old media are bad at. Books are good at being paperwhite,
high-resolution, low-infrastructure, cheap and disposable. Ebooks
are good at being everywhere in the world at the same time for
free in a form that is so malleable that you can just pastebomb
it into your IM session or turn it into a page-a-day mailing
list.
The only really successful epublishing -- I mean, hundreds of
thousands, millions of copies distributed and read -- is the
bookwarez scene, where scanned-and-OCR'd books are distributed on
the darknet. The only legit publishers with any success at
epublishing are the ones whose books cross the Internet without
technological fetter: publishers like Baen Books and my own, Tor,
who are making some or all of their catalogs available in ASCII
and HTML and PDF.
The hardware-dependent ebooks, the DRM use-and-copy-restricted
ebooks, they're cratering. Sales measured in the tens, sometimes
the hundreds. Science fiction is a niche business, but when
you're selling copies by the ten, that's not even a business,
it's a hobby. "
And so he continues but you should read the original. It doesn't suffer from the indented formatting translation by Blogger. I'm going to have to do something about this template and get and RSS feed plus commenting enabled but time pressures are against me at the moment...
"Here's what I'm here to convince you of:
1. That DRM systems don't work
2. That DRM systems are bad for society
3. That DRM systems are bad for business
4. That DRM systems are bad for artists
5. That DRM is a bad business-move for MSFT"
And that was just for starters. It's a bit esoteric if you have not been following the drm and copyright wars but still well worth a read.
"Cryptography -- secret writing -- is the practice of keeping
secrets. It involves three parties: a sender, a receiver and an
attacker (actually, there can be more attackers, senders and
recipients, but let's keep this simple). We usually call these
people Alice, Bob and Carol...
...with dual-key crypto it becomes a lot easier for Alice and Bob to keep their keys secret from Carol, even if they've never met...
...Now, let's apply this to DRM.
In DRM, the attacker is *also the recipient*. It's not Alice and
Bob and Carol, it's just Alice and Bob. Alice sells Bob a DVD.
She sells Bob a DVD player. The DVD has a movie on it -- say,
Pirates of the Caribbean -- and it's enciphered with an algorithm
called CSS -- Content Scrambling System. The DVD player has a CSS
un-scrambler.
Now, let's take stock of what's a secret here: the cipher is
well-known. The ciphertext is most assuredly in enemy hands, arrr.
So what? As long as the key is secret from the attacker, we're
golden.
But there's the rub. Alice wants Bob to buy Pirates of the
Caribbean from her. Bob will only buy Pirates of the Caribbean if
he can descramble the CSS-encrypted VOB -- video object -- on his
DVD player. Otherwise, the disc is only useful to Bob as a
drinks-coaster. So Alice has to provide Bob -- the attacker --
with the key, the cipher and the ciphertext.
Hilarity ensues...
...At the end of the day,
all DRM systems share a common vulnerability: they provide their
attackers with ciphertext, the cipher and the key. At this point,
the secret isn't a secret anymore...
...Here's the social reason that DRM fails: keeping an honest user
honest is like keeping a tall user tall. DRM vendors tell us that
their technology is meant to be proof against average users, not
organized criminal gangs like the Ukranian pirates who stamp out
millions of high-quality counterfeits. It's not meant to be proof
against sophisticated college kids. It's not meant to be proof
against anyone who knows how to edit her registry, or hold down
the shift key at the right moment, or use a search engine. At the
end of the day, the user DRM is meant to defend against is the
most unsophisticated and least capable among us."
Next he tells a story of an honest user a young mum who to avoid the kids getting jam on an expensive DVD tries to make a VHS copy, so that when that gets thoroughly kidified she can copy it again for their use and not have to fork out for another expensive copy of the DVD. This story rings very true with me. I've had to replace one of my son's favourite CDs four times in six years and I only count myself lucky that it has still been commercially available. Cory goes on:
"what this person will do in the long run: she'll find out about
Kazaa and the next time she wants to get a movie for the kids,
she'll download it from the net and burn it for them.
In order to delay that day for as long as possible, our lawmakers
and big rightsholder interests have come up with a disastrous
policy called anticircumvention.
Here's how anticircumvention works: if you put a lock -- an
access control -- around a copyrighted work, it is illegal to
break that lock. It's illegal to make a tool that breaks that
lock. It's illegal to tell someone how to make that tool. It's
illegal to tell someone where she can find out how to make that
tool.
Remember Schneier's Law? Anyone can come up with a security
system so clever that he can't see its flaws. The only way to
find the flaws in security is to disclose the system's workings
and invite public feedback. But now we live in a world where any
cipher used to fence off a copyrighted work is off-limits to that
kind of feedback. That's something that a Princeton engineering
prof named Ed Felten discovered when he submitted a paper to an
academic conference on the failings in the Secure Digital Music
Initiative, a watermarking scheme proposed by the recording
industry. The RIAA responded by threatening to sue his ass if he
tried it. We fought them because Ed is the kind of client that
impact litigators love: unimpeachable and clean-cut and the RIAA
folded. Lucky Ed. Maybe the next guy isn't so lucky...
...Here are the two most important things to know about computers
and the Internet:
1. A computer is a machine for rearranging bits
2. The Internet is a machine for moving bits from one place to
another very cheaply and quickly
Any new medium that takes hold on the Internet and with computers
will embrace these two facts, not regret them. A newspaper press
is a machine for spitting out cheap and smeary newsprint at
speed: if you try to make it output fine art lithos, you'll get
junk. If you try to make it output newspapers, you'll get the
basis for a free society.
And so it is with the Internet...
...
New media don't succeed because they're like the only media, only
better: they succeed because they're worse than the old media at
the stuff the old media is good at, and better at the stuff the
old media are bad at. Books are good at being paperwhite,
high-resolution, low-infrastructure, cheap and disposable. Ebooks
are good at being everywhere in the world at the same time for
free in a form that is so malleable that you can just pastebomb
it into your IM session or turn it into a page-a-day mailing
list.
The only really successful epublishing -- I mean, hundreds of
thousands, millions of copies distributed and read -- is the
bookwarez scene, where scanned-and-OCR'd books are distributed on
the darknet. The only legit publishers with any success at
epublishing are the ones whose books cross the Internet without
technological fetter: publishers like Baen Books and my own, Tor,
who are making some or all of their catalogs available in ASCII
and HTML and PDF.
The hardware-dependent ebooks, the DRM use-and-copy-restricted
ebooks, they're cratering. Sales measured in the tens, sometimes
the hundreds. Science fiction is a niche business, but when
you're selling copies by the ten, that's not even a business,
it's a hobby. "
And so he continues but you should read the original. It doesn't suffer from the indented formatting translation by Blogger. I'm going to have to do something about this template and get and RSS feed plus commenting enabled but time pressures are against me at the moment...
Nice Guardian article on biometrics, Biometrics - great hope for world security or triumph for Big Brother?
Liberty spokesman,Barry Hugill is quoted: "Once you begin to compile massive databases it's a matter of common sense that you are going to get the most horrendous mix-ups, with the wrong people being accused and the the wrong information being shared around the world."
Law enforcement must have enough technically well trained and experienced people and the best available technology to fight the bad guys and there also has to be checks and balances in the system. There is not a computer scientist in the world who knows how to create, secure and maintain the integrity in practice of massive international databases of the kind that are being discussed here. Blind faith in the technology is not going to work in this instance. The current state of affairs neither re-assures me that we have enough technically trained and experienced law enforcement personel or the best available technology appropriately focussed on the job of catching the real bad guys. It is a tough, complex systemic problem and it will not be addressed by an illusion that it is being tackled through huge investment in technologies that don't work
Liberty spokesman,Barry Hugill is quoted: "Once you begin to compile massive databases it's a matter of common sense that you are going to get the most horrendous mix-ups, with the wrong people being accused and the the wrong information being shared around the world."
Law enforcement must have enough technically well trained and experienced people and the best available technology to fight the bad guys and there also has to be checks and balances in the system. There is not a computer scientist in the world who knows how to create, secure and maintain the integrity in practice of massive international databases of the kind that are being discussed here. Blind faith in the technology is not going to work in this instance. The current state of affairs neither re-assures me that we have enough technically trained and experienced law enforcement personel or the best available technology appropriately focussed on the job of catching the real bad guys. It is a tough, complex systemic problem and it will not be addressed by an illusion that it is being tackled through huge investment in technologies that don't work
Thursday, June 17, 2004
Senator Orrin Hatch, praised in the final chapter of Larry Lessig's The Future of Ideas, is proposing the INDUCE Act, the latest in a long line of attempts at further draconian intellectual property legisation. I doubt Larry will be praising this initiative. I can't do better than Susan Crawford on this:
"The logic is that P2P applications inevitably lead to exploitation of children. With me so far? So the act is called the "Inducement Devolves into Unlawful Child Exploitation Act." I'm not even sure that's how "devolves" should be used. But the crimes here go far beyond the title.
The Act (to be proposed tomorrow by songwriter Sen. Hatch and others) amends the copyright law to say that anyone who "induces" copyright infringement is himself/itself an infringer.
"Induce" means intentionally aids, abets, counsels, or procures. So you can't even hire a lawyer if you're doing something risky.
This is amazing. Now we're waaaaaay beyond contributory and vicarious theories of liability, which are court-created and pretty darn broad on their own. See Napster 9th Circuit, Aimster 7th Circuit. It's not even clear what the limit to this is -- "aids" could mean that even something that would have been fair use under the Sony Betamax decision is now an illegal inducement.
And no one can talk to you if they think there's the slightest risk of copyright infringement liability.
We're back to the CBPTDA -- another hugely broad way of making sure that no unauthorized machines ever enter into our lives. If there was ever a moment to organize (see prior post) this might be it."
The CBDTPA was the now defunct proposal of then Sen Hollings in 2002, the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act wonderfully parodied by the EFF. Susan got the initials slightly out of synch but who can blame her. But the
"Inducement Devolves into Unlawful Child Exploitation Act", in the words of another well known American "You cannot be serious!"
"The logic is that P2P applications inevitably lead to exploitation of children. With me so far? So the act is called the "Inducement Devolves into Unlawful Child Exploitation Act." I'm not even sure that's how "devolves" should be used. But the crimes here go far beyond the title.
The Act (to be proposed tomorrow by songwriter Sen. Hatch and others) amends the copyright law to say that anyone who "induces" copyright infringement is himself/itself an infringer.
"Induce" means intentionally aids, abets, counsels, or procures. So you can't even hire a lawyer if you're doing something risky.
This is amazing. Now we're waaaaaay beyond contributory and vicarious theories of liability, which are court-created and pretty darn broad on their own. See Napster 9th Circuit, Aimster 7th Circuit. It's not even clear what the limit to this is -- "aids" could mean that even something that would have been fair use under the Sony Betamax decision is now an illegal inducement.
And no one can talk to you if they think there's the slightest risk of copyright infringement liability.
We're back to the CBPTDA -- another hugely broad way of making sure that no unauthorized machines ever enter into our lives. If there was ever a moment to organize (see prior post) this might be it."
The CBDTPA was the now defunct proposal of then Sen Hollings in 2002, the Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act wonderfully parodied by the EFF. Susan got the initials slightly out of synch but who can blame her. But the
"Inducement Devolves into Unlawful Child Exploitation Act", in the words of another well known American "You cannot be serious!"
Apology
I have to apologise for some of the problems people have been seeing on this blog in recent weeks - in particular (but not limited to) double postings and broken links.
I've been trying to do my posting via my preferred browser, Opera. Unfortunately, however, it doesn't seem to interact too well with the Blogger site leading to the kinds of problems people have noticed, so as of today I'm giving up and sadly reverting to IE for weblog postings.
I have to apologise for some of the problems people have been seeing on this blog in recent weeks - in particular (but not limited to) double postings and broken links.
I've been trying to do my posting via my preferred browser, Opera. Unfortunately, however, it doesn't seem to interact too well with the Blogger site leading to the kinds of problems people have noticed, so as of today I'm giving up and sadly reverting to IE for weblog postings.
It seems I may have made a mistake when I reported recently that the EU Commission and Council of ministers had managed to see off the EU Parliament's court challenge to the decision on transfer of airline passenger data to the US.
According to the latest EDR-gram the legal affairs committee of the EU parliament (JURI) yesterday renewed their decision to take the Commission and the Council of ministers to the European Court of Justice on the issue.
"EU Parliament renews decision to take Commission to court ============================================================
The Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (JURI) decided today to take the European Commission as well as the Council to court over the final agreement to transfer PNR data to the US without adequate guarantees for data protection.
The committee, which met today (16 June 2004) for an extraordinary meeting during the Parliament's present recession, voted to call upon the Luxembourg Court to defer the Commission's so-called adequacy finding. This finding claims that the data will find the same level of protection in the U.S. as in the EU. The committee also voted to take the international agreement to court that was signed by the EU Council with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security on 28 May 2004 (see EDRi-gram 2.11). Today's vote was taken with a two-thirds majority concerning the adequacy finding and 19 to 14 votes concerning the international agreement. This is an even clearer majority than in former votes on the same issue.
The JURI committee's decision must still be confirmed by the EU Parliament's Group leaders in a meeting this evening, but it is widely considered that this confirmation is only a formality after no less than six votes in the Parliament to stop the ongoing transfer.
There are however also indications that the Parliament's outgoing President, Pat Cox, has been trying to turn over the wide consensus against the transfer within the EU Parliament. Before the vote in the Committee, a member of the Parliament's judicial service, which is attached to the President's office and obliged to be politically neutral, tried to convince MEPs in a 25-minute speech that there was no legal basis for taking the other two EU institutions to court. Mr. Cox is one of the possible candidates for the presidency of the EU Commission and could thus become subject to an EU Court of Justice case himself. Outgoing Italian Radical MEP Marco Cappato criticised the Judicial Services' intervention as based 'more on political than on legal grounds' and therefore 'an abuse'.
EU-US air data row hots up (16.06.2004) http://www.eupolitix.com/EN/News/200406/8f1cbb0f-bc0c-4583-b514-4b029ed1f942.htm
PNR data deal signed by European Commission (02.06.2004) http://www.edri.org/cgi-bin/index?id=000100000151
(Contribution by Andreas Dietl, EDRI EU affairs director)"
Update: The FT have picked up the story.
According to the latest EDR-gram the legal affairs committee of the EU parliament (JURI) yesterday renewed their decision to take the Commission and the Council of ministers to the European Court of Justice on the issue.
"EU Parliament renews decision to take Commission to court ============================================================
The Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (JURI) decided today to take the European Commission as well as the Council to court over the final agreement to transfer PNR data to the US without adequate guarantees for data protection.
The committee, which met today (16 June 2004) for an extraordinary meeting during the Parliament's present recession, voted to call upon the Luxembourg Court to defer the Commission's so-called adequacy finding. This finding claims that the data will find the same level of protection in the U.S. as in the EU. The committee also voted to take the international agreement to court that was signed by the EU Council with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security on 28 May 2004 (see EDRi-gram 2.11). Today's vote was taken with a two-thirds majority concerning the adequacy finding and 19 to 14 votes concerning the international agreement. This is an even clearer majority than in former votes on the same issue.
The JURI committee's decision must still be confirmed by the EU Parliament's Group leaders in a meeting this evening, but it is widely considered that this confirmation is only a formality after no less than six votes in the Parliament to stop the ongoing transfer.
There are however also indications that the Parliament's outgoing President, Pat Cox, has been trying to turn over the wide consensus against the transfer within the EU Parliament. Before the vote in the Committee, a member of the Parliament's judicial service, which is attached to the President's office and obliged to be politically neutral, tried to convince MEPs in a 25-minute speech that there was no legal basis for taking the other two EU institutions to court. Mr. Cox is one of the possible candidates for the presidency of the EU Commission and could thus become subject to an EU Court of Justice case himself. Outgoing Italian Radical MEP Marco Cappato criticised the Judicial Services' intervention as based 'more on political than on legal grounds' and therefore 'an abuse'.
EU-US air data row hots up (16.06.2004) http://www.eupolitix.com/EN/News/200406/8f1cbb0f-bc0c-4583-b514-4b029ed1f942.htm
PNR data deal signed by European Commission (02.06.2004) http://www.edri.org/cgi-bin/index?id=000100000151
(Contribution by Andreas Dietl, EDRI EU affairs director)"
Update: The FT have picked up the story.
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