PIPCU takedown of 50,000 sites

The Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit (PIPCU), a department of the City of London Police, noted on Twitter that it has taken down 50,000 websites since its inception in 2013. On asking for further details, they advised I send in a freedom of information request which the information officer has now kindly responded to.

My email went to 'foi@city-of-london.pnn.police.uk'

The Freedom of Information Officer

City of London Police

PO Box 36451

182 Bishopsgate

London EC2M 4WN

Transcript of the response (I've put the extracts from my email in italics) -

Dear Mr Corrigan, 

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION REF: COL/18/618 

I write in connection with your request for information dated 04 July 2018 in which you seek access to the following information: 

I was really interested to discover, via your Twitter account, that since your inception in 2013, you have taken down 50,000 websites that you believe were committing IP crime.
https://twitter.com/CityPolicePIPCU/status/1014434074289635328 

I have been advised by the people behind your Twitter account that I should contact you for further details. I would, therefore, be grateful for further information and a breakdown of the detailed statistics you have in relation to these 50,000 websites. 

In particular – 

What proportion of these 50,000 websites proved to be engaged in criminal activities? 

All but one of the sites showed significant evidence of being engaged in criminality. 

What proportion of the 50,000 were not involved in crime and were eventually cleared and re-instated? 

One site has been reinstated as it was not involved in crime. 

How many police officers and police hours were engaged in the investigations that led to the take down of these 50,000 sites? 

The majority of the work is undertaken by one officer working full time (i.e. 40 hours per week since 2014, excluding leave, courses etc). It is impossible to calculate the exact number of hours, particularly as the officer has support from others in the unit. 

Statistics on the extent and seriousness of these crimes. 

No information held. 

The estimated economic impact on affected parties and industries. 

No information held. 

Estimates of the detrimental impacts on the public of the effects of the sale of counterfeit goods through any of these 50,000 websites. 

No information held. 

A demographic breakdown of the geographic locations of the most serious offenders e.g. by jurisdiction (in the assumption that there will be a significant impact from offenders outside of the UK). 

No information held. 

A demographic breakdown of the nature of the offenders e.g. were they organised criminal gangs or individuals? 

No information held. 

The proportion of offenders who were eventually prosecuted and in which jurisdictions. 

Operation Ashiko has not been directly responsible for any prosecutions. 

The proportion of offenders who were eventually convicted and in which jurisdictions. 

Operation Ashiko has not been directly responsible for any prosecutions. 

The proportion of the sites that were involved in selling counterfeit goods.

All sites in respect of this operation are involved in the sale of counterfeit goods. 

The proportion of the sites that were involved in copyright infringement. 

None. 

The proportion of the sites that were involved in patent infringement. 

None. 

The proportion of the sites that were involved in trademark infringement. 

All sites in respect of this operation are involved in trademark infringement. 

Should you have any further questions regarding your request, please contact me via e-mail, letter or telephone, quoting the reference number above.